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This study evaluated money laundering investigation conducted at the Financial and Asset 
Forfeiture Investigation (FAFI) Unit of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) 
in Pretoria. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews conducted with financial 
and asset forfeiture investigators attached to the DPCI who are responsible for investigating 
money laundering. From the results of this study, it became apparent that participants 
experience a number of challenges in the investigation of money laundering. This study makes 
recommendations that could empower investigators at the FAFI of the DPCI with enhanced 
skills and knowledge to effectively investigate cases of money laundering. 
 
Key terms 
Corruption, financial investigation, money laundering, proceeds of crime, Financial and Asset 






LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AFU   Asset Forfeiture Unit 
CAS                            Crime Administration System 
CIPC   Companies and Intellectual Properties Commission 
DOJ & CD  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
DPCI   Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
ESAAMLG  Eastern and Southern Anti-Money Laundering Group   
FAFI   Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigation 
FATF   Financial Action Task Force 
FI   Financial Investigation 
FIC   Financial Intelligence Centre 
FICA   Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IMF-FSAP DPCI International Monetary Fund – Financial Sector Assessment Program 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
INTERPOL  International Policing Agency 
JSE   Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
MLA   Mutual Legal Assistance 
MER   Mutual Evaluation Report 
NPA   National Prosecuting Authority 
PRECCA  Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act  
POCA   Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
POCDATARA Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and  
   Related Activities Act 
SA   South Africa 
SABRIC  South African Banks Risk Information Centre 
SAICB  South African Insurance Crime Bureau 
SARPCCO  Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation 
SARS   South African Revenue Service 





STR   Suspicious Transaction Reports 
SCCI   Serious Commercial Crime Investigations 
SOCI   Serious Organised Crime Investigations 
STR   Suspicious Transaction Reports 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ..................................................................................................................................... i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... ii 
ABSTRACT  ................................................................................................................................... iii 
Key terms  ........................................................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................ iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... vi 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION ............................................................................................ 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 BACKGROUND HISTORY ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.2.1 The mandate of the Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigative Unit ....................................... 2 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT ......................................................................................................... 6 
1.3.1 Researcher’s experience in the investigation of money laundering .......................................... 11 
1.4 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY ......................................................................................... 11 
1.5    AIM OF THE RESEARCH ...................................................................................................... 11 
1.6 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH ............................................................................................ 12 
1.7       RESEARCH QUESTION UNDER INVESTIGATION ........................................................... 12 
1.8 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS ......................................................................................... 13 
1.8.1 Money laundering ..................................................................................................................... 13 
1.8.2 Fraud ......................................................................................................................................... 13 
1.8.3 Financial crime .......................................................................................................................... 13 
1.8.4 Bank statement .......................................................................................................................... 13 
1.8.5 Financial Investigation .............................................................................................................. 14 
1.9 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH ................................................................................................ 14 
1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 15 
1.10.1 Research design and approach .................................................................................................. 15 
1.10.2 Target population and sampling ................................................................................................ 16 
1.10.3 Data collection .......................................................................................................................... 17 
1.10.4 Data analysis ............................................................................................................................. 19 
1.10.5 Trustworthiness of the study ..................................................................................................... 20 
1.10.5.1 Credibility .......................................................................................................................... 20 





1.10.5.3 Dependability .................................................................................................................... 21 
1.10.5.4 Confirmability ................................................................................................................... 21 
1.11     ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................................... 22 
1.11.1 Informed consent ....................................................................................................................... 22 
1.11.2 Protection from harm ................................................................................................................ 22 
1.11.3 Anonymity and confidentiality ................................................................................................. 23 
1.11.4 Right to privacy ......................................................................................................................... 23 
1.12 SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. 23 
CHAPTER 2: THE INVESTIGATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ................................................ 24 
2.1  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 24 
2.2 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK REGULATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE 
PROCEEDS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ............................................................................... 25 
2.2.1  Prevention of Organised Crime Act .......................................................................................... 25 
2.2.2 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act ............................................................... 28 
2.2.3  Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act ........... 28 
2.2.4 Financial Intelligence Centre Act .............................................................................................. 29 
2.3 THE FINANCIAL AND ASSET FORFEITURE UNIT .......................................................... 32 
2.4 THE PROCEEDS OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES ................................................................. 34 
2.4.1 Section 4 of POCA – Money laundering .................................................................................. 34 
2.4.2 Section 5 of POCA – Assisting another to benefit from the proceeds of unlawful activities ... 34 
2.4.3 Section 6 of POCA – Acquisition, possession or use of proceeds of unlawful activities35 
2.4.4 Penalties .................................................................................................................................... 35 
2.5    OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION ............................................................... 36 
2.6 MONEY LAUNDERING INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGY .................................................... 38 
2.7 PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS IN RELATION TO FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION ...... 40 
2.8 THE PROCESS OF CONDUCTING FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION ................................. 41 
2.8.1  Referral of cases to the FAFI unit ............................................................................................. 43 
2.8.2 Investigation plan ...................................................................................................................... 46 
2.8.3 Gathering of information........................................................................................................... 46 
2.9 FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES .................................................................... 49 
2.10 SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. 52 
CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................. 54 





3.2 SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. 54 
3.3 FINDINGS ................................................................................................................................ 55 
3.3.1 Findings on participants’ familiarity with the legislative framework governing money 
laundering and the proceeds of illegal activities ....................................................................... 55 
3.3.2 Findings on participants’ skills and knowledge to efficiently investigate money laundering cases
 56 
3.3.3 Findings on participants’ familiarity with the mandate of the Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigative Unit ...................................................................................................................... 56 
3.3.4 Findings on participants’ knowledge regarding the objectives of a financial investigation ..... 57 
3.3.5 Findings on participants’ challenges experienced in the investigation of money laundering ... 57 
3.3.6 Findings on the role and responsibilities of financial and asset forfeiture investigators during 
the investigation of money laundering ...................................................................................... 58 
3.3.7 Findings on contributing factors resulting in the low conviction rate of money laundering ..... 59 
3.3.8 Findings on the adequacy of resources to effectively investigate money laundering ............... 59 
3.3.9 Findings on the investigative technique/s used during the investigation of money laundering 60 
3.4  RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................... 60 
3.4.1 Recommendations on participants’ familiarity with the legislative framework governing money 
laundering and the proceeds of illegal activities ....................................................................... 60 
3.4.2 Recommendations on participants’ skills and knowledge to efficiently investigate money 
laundering cases ........................................................................................................................ 61 
3.4.3 Recommendations on participants’ familiarity with the mandate of the Financial and Asset 
Forfeiture Investigative Unit ..................................................................................................... 62 
3.4.4 Recommendations regarding participants’ knowledge regarding the objectives of a financial 
investigation .............................................................................................................................. 62 
3.4.5 Recommendations on participants’ challenges experienced in the investigation of money 
laundering .................................................................................................................................. 63 
3.4.6 Recommendations on the role and responsibilities of financial and asset forfeiture investigators 
during the investigation of money laundering ........................................................................... 63 
3.4.7 Recommendations on contributing factors resulting in the low conviction rate of money 
laundering .................................................................................................................................. 64 
3.4.8 Recommendations on the adequacy of resources to effectively investigate money laundering64 
3.4.9 Recommendations on the investigative technique/s used during the investigation of money 
laundering .................................................................................................................................. 65 
3.5 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 66 





APPENDIX A   LETTER OF APPROVAL TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE ................................................................................. 72 
APPENDIX B ETHICS APPROVAL: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA ................................. 73 
APPENDIX C CONFIRMATION OF PROOFREADING ............................................................... 74 
APPENDIX D INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ....................................................................................... 75 
 
LIST OF TABLES 















CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Financial crimes are being committed by criminals in order to enrich themselves with the 
proceeds of crime. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), financial crime 
constitutes crime that is not of a violent nature and that leads to financial losses (Ryder, 2011:2). 
The term ‘financial crime’ is not explained the same around the world (Ryder, 2011:2). Ryder 
(2011:2) further states that financial crime is commonly considered as covering the offences of 
fraud, terrorist financing, money laundering, bribery and corruption, and information security. 
Money laundering is one of the most commonly used types of financial crime and it can hinder 
the operations of financial institutions. Countries, including South Africa (SA), are targeted as 
a safe haven for money laundering activities and are mostly used by criminals to avoid or evade 
tax. These countries are targeted for money laundering as the launderers will either pay low or 
no tax on their illicit funds.  
 
The next chapter outlines the background history of the Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigation (DPCI), the mandate of the Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigative (FAFI) 
unit, the problem statement, the delimitation of the study, the aim of the research, the purpose 
of the research, the research questions under investigation, the key theoretical concepts, the 
value of the research, the research design and approach, the target population and sampling, 
data collection, data analysis, the trustworthiness of the study and the ethical considerations. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND HISTORY 
The South African Police Service (SAPS) established an independent division under its wings 
(the DPCI) (also known as the Hawks) in July 2009 in terms of section 17C of the South African 
Police Service Act, No. 65 of 1995 (South Africa, 1995) (SAPS Act), as amended by the South 
African Police Service Amendment Act, No. 57 of 2008 (South Africa, 2008). As national 
priority crimes (serious organised and serious commercial crime, as well as serious corruption, 
including serious economic offences) constitute a major problem for South Africa, the DPCI 
should investigate these and find ways to combat and prevent them. This responsibility is given 





Priority Crime Investigation, 2014). The DPCI was instituted through passing an Act in 
Parliament and includes the Commercial Crime Unit, Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigative Unit, Organised Crime Unit, the Priority Crime Management Centre and Support 
Services. The head of the DPCI is appointed by the Minister of Police and the rest of the 
personnel by the National Commissioner. All staff members in the employment of the DPCI 
must submit to certain criteria and can only be appointed after obtaining security clearances 
(Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, 2011:1).  
 
1.2.1 The mandate of the Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigative Unit 
The FAFI component of the DPCI was established to ensure that financial gain is taken out of 
crime. Furthermore, the unit is mandated to utilise the relevant legislation optimally to 
investigate, identify, seize and forfeit the assets of criminals (and their organisations) that are 
the proceeds of crime or that were obtained through criminal activities (South African Police 
Service, [sa]:2). 
 
Within the FAFI unit, the DPCI has two units, namely Financial Investigations and Asset 
Forfeiture Investigations. According to the FAFI Operational Plan 2013/2014 (South African 
Police Service, 2012(b)), the financial investigations unit focuses its responsibilities on the 
investigation of the financial aspects of national priority crime.  
 
The operationalisation of the DPCI FAFI investigations is primarily guided by the Guidance 
Document: Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police Service, 
[sa]:8), the Standard Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 
(South African Police Service, 2010) as well as the Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015). These directives focus 
on the mandate of the FAFI, standard operating procedures and the FAFI investigations 
strategy. These directives further set out financial investigative methodology procedures to 
ensure the efficient management of processes in financial investigation to and give direction 
and provide guidelines to assist the operational divisions of the DPCI FAFI to do investigations 






The purpose of the Guidance Document: Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South 
African Police Service, [sa]) is to: 
- highlight the importance of financial and asset forfeiture investigations. 
- highlight the importance of the relevant legislation in South Africa.  
- highlight the importance of international responsibilities with regard to financial 
investigation. 
- provide guidance on the role and responsibilities of each of the SAPS investigators 
during investigation. 
- provide guidance on the process of referring cases to the FAFI. 
 
The Standard Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 
(South African Police Service, 2010) sets out financial investigative methodology procedures 
to ensure the smooth handling of processes in financial investigation and to give direction and 
provide guidelines to assist the operational divisions of the DPCI FAFI to do investigations into 
financial deals and losses of assets in an effective and efficient manner. The Financial and 
Asset Forfeiture Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015). The 
purpose of this document is to give direction and provide guidelines to render an effective and 
efficient financial and asset forfeiture investigation service to the operational components of 
the DPCI FAFI and the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) of the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA).  
 
According to the Standard Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: Information 
Note 3/1/5 (South African Police Service, 2010), as well as the Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015), the FAFI unit is 
mandated to conduct the following investigations: 
 Any offence referred to in section 16 of the SAPS Act of 1995 (South Africa, 1995) 
 Suspicious transaction reports (STR) referred to the DPCI by the Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC) as stipulated in section 40 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA), 
No. 38 of 2001 (South Africa, 2001) 
 Any offence referred to in the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist 





 Offences relating to racketeering activities – section 2 of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act (POCA), No. 121 of 1998 (South Africa, 1998) 
 Offences relating to the proceeds of unlawful activities – sections 4, 5 and 6 of the 
POCA  
 Life-style investigations in terms of section 22 of the POCA and section 23 of 
Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA), No. 12 of 2004 
(South Africa, 2004b). 
 
The FAFI unit is responsible for providing support in terms of asset forfeiture investigations as 
required in criminal and civil forfeiture applications in terms of Chapter 5 (Criminal Forfeiture) 
and Chapter 6 (Civil Forfeiture) of the POCA of 1998 with specific focus on the following 
priority crimes: 
 Organised crime where syndicates are involved (including endangered species) 
 Narcotic-related crime 
 Cash seizures where the amount involved is at least R30 000,00 
 Serious violent crimes with an economic motive, such as cash heists 
 Serious economic offences 
 Serious corruption cases where senior state officials are involved 
 Cases involving the abuse of attorneys’ trust accounts 
 Advanced fee payment scams 
 Cases involving lifestyle criminals 
 Identifying and reporting of non-compliance in terms of the POCA of 1998 
(SAPS, 2013b). 
 
Furthermore, the FAFI unit is responsible for section 205 applications to financial institutions 
in terms of section 71 of the POCA of 1998 and section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
No. 51 of 1977. This unit is also responsible for the execution of confiscation/forfeiture orders 
in terms of sections 27 and 38(4) of the POCA of 1998.  
 
The Guidance Document: Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police 





Note 3/1/5 (South African Police Service, 2010) as well as the Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015) set out the role and 
responsibilities of the FAFI financial and asset forfeiture investigators as follows: 
 Conducting an investigation into possible money laundering offences that may be added 
to the criminal charges. The financial investigator will require copies of some 
documents that the criminal investigator has obtained such as bank account documents. 
Any documents obtained by the financial investigator will be prepared in such a way 
that they can be used as evidence in a court of law. That would include the taking of 
statements. 
 Doing lifestyle investigations. These types of investigations may be conducted based 
on a criminal case docket or an enquiry, depending on the circumstances.  
 Investigating suspicious transaction reports (STRs), which the FIC submits, as if an 
enquiry was made. 
 
While the financial investigator performs the investigation, all the financial transactions will be 
inspected obtain evidence that money was laundered. During this investigation, the investigator 
may also identify the assets. It should be noted that in commercial crime cases, the criminal 
investigator may have already conducted a financial investigation. However, cognisance should 
also be taken of third-party involvement in criminal cases that must not be overlooked. The role 
of the financial investigator is a very important one. 
 
The earnings from financial crimes as well as the way in which such crimes were conducted 
must be sought and found by the forfeiture investigator. During this investigation, the 
investigator will conduct searches on several databases, visit premises and perform more 
actions to obtain proof of ownership of assets and/or property. These investigators also provide 
information and assist prosecutors in making informed decisions about property that is targeted 







1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to Creswell (2014:108), a study needs to be done when there is a problem or issue 
(also called the problem statement). A researcher cannot research his own complete interest in 
a certain topic and therefore has to limit the research to a particular research issue, which will 
be the research problem.  
 
Chatain, McDowell, Mousset, Schott and Van der Does de Willebois (2009:xi) and Moshi 
(2007:2) state that the earnings derived from criminal exercises are increased and fraud is 
amplified by the concealment of money, which negatively influences the social, economic, 
political and cultural improvement of the people around the world. Moshi (2007:2) reiterates 
that legitimate and foreign investors will not in any way conduct business with or invest in a 
country where money laundering takes place and, in this way, the relevant country’s access to 
foreign markets and investment will be severely hampered, which means that the economy of 
that country will not grow. Money laundering also harms critical financial sector institutions in 
a country. According to Moodley (2008:16), the integrity of financial markets and the country’s 
reputation are put at risk by money laundering as it has an impact on the medium of exchange 
and interest rate of a country. According to McDowell and Novis (2001:6), money laundering 
encourages offences, such as dealing of drugs and illegal arms, terrorism and corruption 
(Goredema, 2006:10).  
 
According to a report by Moodley (2008:11), money laundering has a global impact of more 
than 6 000 United States dollar. Of this amount, only approximately two percent is retrieved. 
According to Shevel (as cited by Moodley, 2008:3), an approximate amount of R70 billion to 
R80 billion is laundered in South Africa annually. Goredema (2006:8) states that these 
laundered moneys are largely earnings derived from crimes. De Koker (2012:3) mentions that 
nationally and universally, huge amounts of money are laundered; however, the amount of 
money involved is not known because sufficient statistics are not held to be able to conclude 
on an amount. South Africa is a soft target for international and local crime organisations due 
to the fact that it is the financial hub in Africa, has a sophisticated banking and financial sector, 






Goredema (2006:7) states that despite the vastly increased scope for prosecutions created by 
the POCA (South Africa, 1998) and the FICA of 2001 (South Africa, 2001), state prosecutions 
for money laundering are still disappointingly few and far between. There has been a low 
conviction rate of money laundering cases since the establishment of FAFI in 2012. Statistics 
for the period February 2012 to November 2014 indicate that 63 cases and 52 STRs were 
referred to the FAFI unit (head office) for financial investigations. During the 2015/16 financial 
year, 31 cases and 103 STRs were registered at the FAFI unit. From these 31 cases, two were 
closed with no prospects of successful prosecution and 29 were being investigated and pending 
outcome at the time of this study. Eight STRs had been closed. After investigation, no crimes 
were detected from the eight closed STRs and prosecutors were reluctant to add money 
laundering charges (Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigation Case Control Registers 2015/2016, 2016). Emanating from these cases and STRs, 
only one conviction of money laundering has been secured as per the SAPS Garsfontein Case 
Administration System (CAS) 304/11/2011. The statistics of money laundering cases were not 
properly kept because the financial investigative capacity was not established within the DPCI. 
According to the SAPS Annual Report of 2015/16 (South African Police Service, 2016:202), 
there is no indication of money laundering statistics as investigated by the FAFI unit. This 
annual report of the SAPS indicates the crimes in terms of the POCA and, according to this 
report, one case has been received and one conviction secured during 2015 and 2016 in terms 
of section 4 of the POCA:  
 The FAFI unit is a relatively new unit in the investigation of money laundering, and 
although it creates opportunities to deal more effectively with crime, it also comes with 
many challenges, such as the low conviction rate of money laundering cases. These low 
money laundering conviction rates could be as a result of limited skills and training of 
financial and asset forfeiture investigators when it comes to the investigation of money 
laundering. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2012a:8), countries 
should ensure that their FAFI units are empowered with enough financial investigators 
who are properly trained and have experience to conduct financial investigations by 
using domestic laws and international conventions and standards. Furthermore, more 
attention is given to finding and indicting the offences leading to the money laundering 





In addition, it is also possible that these cases are not often prosecuted because 
investigators are not knowledgeable about what exactly a financial investigation should 
look at or what the FAFI unit should do. Most of the referrals to the FAFI unit are 
enquiries and projects. These enquiries and projects are intelligence driven 
investigations where no criminal case is registered. Financial investigations will be 
conducted, but the matter will not be taken to court for money laundering before the 
investigator can establish the criminal link to money laundering. Financial 
investigations should be done together with investigations of normal or other predicate 
offences (FATF, 2012a:8). 
 
In 2003, the FATF mentioned that South Africa does not have many money laundering 
prosecutions (Mutual Evaluation Report-Executive Summary: Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism – South Africa, 2009:5). According to the FATF 
(2003:3), the unit came into being to find ways to stop money laundering. The G-7 Summit 
established the unit in 1989 to institute procedures to safeguard financial organisations 
worldwide against money laundering (Cox, 2011:16). Because South Africa belongs to the 
FATF, it has to comply with the anti-money laundering policies established by the unit and is 
measured on such compliance.  
 
Organisations in the financial sector as well as the programmes of offshore financial centres 
have to implement and comply with the said anti-money-laundering standards and he 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is responsible for the monitoring of such compliance 
(Moshi, 2007:4). South Africa has been assessed by the IMF in terms of money laundering 
investigations and prosecutions for the period from 2011 to 2013 (with a focus on money 
laundering linked to corruption and financial fraud) (SAPS, 2014a). According to the 
International Monetary Fund – Financial Sector Assessment Program Directorate for Priority 
Crime Investigation (IMF-FSAP DPCI) report (South African Police Service. Directorate for 
Priority Crime Investigation, 2014a), which was presented to the IMF, the statistics of money 







 Cases on hand    =  177 
 Pending court    = 58 
 Pending investigation   = 77 
 Public prosecutor’s decision  = 08 
 Convictions    = 34  
 
It is uncertain if law enforcement in South Africa is effective in this regard because of 
insufficient statistics, as found by the FATF’s evaluation in 2003 (Geldenhuys, 2016:26). These 
statistics also highlighted that, at the end of 2010, the SAPS had received 477 STRs from the 
FIC. These STRs were dealt with in the following manner as per Table 1.1 below. 
 
TABLE 1.1 SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTS 
     
DESCRIPTION NUMBER 
Balance brought forward 477 
Investigation finalised 132 
Reports converted to criminal cases 75 
Reports under investigation 270 
(South African Police Service. Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, 2014a)     
 
Notwithstanding the resources that South Africa has to make a success of convicting money 
laundering cases, there are very few convictions. In terms of finances and legal abilities, South 
Africa is capable to do many money laundering investigations and get prosecutions from these 
investigations because of the high level of organised crime in the country. However, still very 
few such investigations are done in the country, although there is a confirmed high level of 
organised crime and predicate offences (Financial Action Task Force, 2009:79). 
 
The Commercial Crime: DPCI statistics of 2012 (SAPS, 2013a) indicate that six money 
laundering cases charged under the POCA (South Africa, 1998) were received for investigation. 
Out of these six cases, nine accused were convicted on 136 counts. In 2013, eight money 





were convicted of money laundering on 11 counts (SAPS, 2013a). According to the SAPS 
(2016:203), one money laundering case has been received and one conviction has been secured 
in terms of sections 4 and 5 of the POCA. These statistics show that although there are many 
money laundering cases in South Africa, not many are handed over for investigation and 
conviction. The statistics presented to the FATF by South Africa were not comprehensive. 
Previously, the statistics which were presented to the FATF were compiled by the NPA and the 
Commercial Crime Unit. The poor maintenance of statistics and data in South Africa needs to 
be corrected by the relevant authorities (FATF, 2009:39). 
 
According to the FAFI Standard Operating Procedure for Investigating Capacities: 
Information Note 3/1/5 (South African Police Service, 2010:1), historically, the SAPS has been 
involved in the investigation of the activities of criminal syndicates. De Koker (2012:2) states 
that law enforcement agencies were mainly concerned with the crime that was perpetrated to 
yield the earnings and they largely disregarded the acts performed to obtain these earnings. If 
these activities were indeed investigated, it was to establish a connection between the 
perpetrator and the crime. Organised crime is very lucrative and it flourishes worldwide. In 
South Africa, organised crime is rife and is perpetuated by organised groups. The types of 
crimes these groups are involved in include vehicle theft, the smuggling of narcotics and 
abalone, and trafficking in arms, humans, and mineral and precious stones. A total of 491 fraud 
schemes, counterfeit cheques, credit cards and pyramid schemes are used often in South Africa 
(FATF, 2003: 15). 
 
The motive for organised crime is to generate profit. Money laundering is a crime committed 
mostly by organised criminals. Traditionally, law enforcement focused on arresting the 
criminals and paid no attention to seizing the ill-gotten gains (SAPS, 2011:1). However, this 
has now changed because the families of the criminals resume these activities while the 







1.3.1 Researcher’s experience in the investigation of money laundering 
The researcher is an investigator at the DPCI FAFI and investigates money laundering and 
conduct tracing of assets acquired from illegal activities. When a criminal matter is handed to 
this unit, the financial and asset forfeiture investigation is done jointly by investigators from 
the Financial Investigation Unit and the Asset Forfeiture Investigation Unit. The researcher is 
an asset forfeiture investigator and has been working in this capacity since 2012.  
 
However, the researcher has set aside her previous experience of the phenomenon under 
examination and started to look into the opinions of the participants while being busy with the 
phenomenon. Creswell (2013:80) suggests that the feelings of researchers about the 
phenomenon are first considered and discussed and only then they involve the feelings of 
others. In the same vein, the researcher took a new approach to the phenomenon and did not 
regard her own experiences with the phenomenon after discussing them. This is called 
bracketing.  
 
1.4 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
This study was limited to the FAFI unit of the DPCI head office in Pretoria, South Africa. As 
mentioned in 1.2.1, the FAFI unit is mandated to investigate, identify, seize and forfeit the 
assets of criminals (and their organisations) that are the proceeds of crime or that were obtained 
through criminal activities. These investigations include the financial aspects of national 
priority crime, such as money laundering. As a result, this study evaluated money laundering 
investigations conducted at the FAFI unit in Pretoria.  
 
1.5    AIM OF THE RESEARCH  
According to Denscombe (2010:14), a short summation of the aims of the investigation, which 
should include broad descriptions of the researcher’s overall goals or target, should be given at 
the beginning of any research report.  
 
This study aimed to evaluate the investigation of money laundering investigations conducted 






Official DPCI FAFI directives were primarily used as a measure to evaluate the investigation 
of money laundering investigations conducted at the DPCI FAFI unit in Pretoria since the 
establishment of the FAFI in 2012, as per the study’s identified research aim. Consequently, 
these directives were also used as benchmark against participants’ responses in order to address 
the purpose of the research as set out in section 1.6 and the research question as set out in 
section 1.7. The contents of these directives, as presented in Chapter 2, include the Guidance 
Document: Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police Service, [sa]), 
the Standard Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 (South 
African Police Service, 2010) and the Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations Strategy 
2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015). 
 
1.6 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Denscombe (2010:8), the basis on which the research is evaluated is the 
knowledge the evaluator has of the purpose of the research, because the deliverables of the 
research project is underscored by the purpose (Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin, 2012:118)  
indicate that research purposes are the deliverables of the research project. In harmony with 
Denscombe (2010:8) and Zikmund et al. (2012:118), the identified purpose of this study is as 
follows: 
 
▪ To determine whether the DPCI FAFI unit is achieving its proposed investigative 
mandate to effectively investigate money laundering, as mentioned in section 1.2 above. 
▪ To identify and describe challenges/shortcomings experienced by the DPCI FAFI 
investigators to effectively investigate money laundering. 
   
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTION UNDER INVESTIGATION 
The aim of the research questions is to present the research problem in such a way that it would 
be easy to investigate it and from there define the nature and scope of the research (Lewis-
Beck, Bryman & Ligo, 2004: 966). As a result of the low conviction rate of money laundering 
cases since the establishment of the FAFI in 2012, as illustrated in paragraph 1.3 above, the 





 What are the challenges/shortcomings experienced by DPCI FAFI investigators in the 
effective investigation of money laundering? 
 
1.8 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
According to Mouton (1996:187), a definition is a declaration of the restrictions and definitions 
of a word with respect to its meaning and what it refers to. The following concepts are central 
to this study: 
 
1.8.1 Money laundering 
Madinger (2012:5) states that money laundering entails obscuring the identities of the persons 
who yielded proceeds from criminal activities and then using legitimate channels to make it 
seem as if the proceeds were yielded in a legal way According to the FICA (South Africa, 
2001), ‘money laundering’ or ‘money laundering activity’ relates to any occurrence that hides 
the truth about where the proceeds come from, as well as what is done with it after it has been 
obtained. It also hides the identification of people that were involved in these activities. These 
activities are stated as offences in section 64 of this Act or section 4, 5 or 6 of the POCA, Act 
121 of 1998 (South Africa, 1998). 
 
1.8.2 Fraud 
Fraud is defined by Snyman (2002:520) as the “unlawful and intentional making of a 
representation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another.” 
 
1.8.3 Financial crime 
Financial crime involves “the use of deception for illegal gain, normally involving breach of 
trust, and some concealment of the true nature of the activities” (Pickett & Pickett, 2002:3). 
 
1.8.4 Bank statement 
Bank statement is defined as “a detailed account of all financial activities (debits and credits) 






1.8.5 Financial Investigation  
According to the Guidance Document: Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South 
African Police Service, [sa]:5), a financial investigation has as one of its aims the retrieval of 
documents proving the movement of money. Such documents are called a paper trail. 
Documents often used that constitute a paper trail are bank accounts, and documents proving 
ownership of fixed property or motor vehicles, among others. If such paper trail is found, very 
much information could be obtained as evidence that criminal activities took place. The 
following steps in this investigation are first to find the connection to show how the proceeds 
were obtained, where it was moved to from there and when, and finally where it is stored. A 
financial investigation creates a profile of the criminal and his businesses and relatives. 
Therefore, the financial investigation resembles a criminal investigation, with the difference 
being that the aim of the financial investigation is to find the proceeds yielded from the crime. 
Normal investigative techniques all apply and are merely transposed to the financial area, such 
as: 
 making a direct comparison where records with a historical connection to the suspect 
are examined. 
 comparing income against expenditure. Unidentified cash is questioned. 
 examining the net worth of an individual – the assets and liabilities. Increases must have 
a reason, for instance increases in salary, legal business operations or proceeds from a 
criminal activity. 
 
1.9 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
Denscombe (2002:43) is of the view that research must contribute to the existing body of 
knowledge on the subject, satisfy practical needs and be significant to contemporary issues. It 
is important to undertake this study due to the fact that the economy of the country is being 
adversely affected by financial crimes, with special reference to money laundering in order to 
find out what the role of the FAFI unit is in investigations of money laundering. Previously, the 
criminals were convicted for the predicate offence but not punished for the benefits or profit 
that was derived from that predicate offence.  
 





 Inadequacies and problems that are encountered by financial and asset forfeiture 
investigators were pinpointed. 
 It assisted financial and asset forfeiture investigators to perform efficient investigations 
into money laundering. 
 Brought more academic knowledge that students and researchers can use in future. 
 Made a contribution to society in South Africa and added knowledge to the field of 
financial crime, which is extremely necessary due to the fact that money laundering 
keeps increasing and having a negative influence on South Africa’s economy 
 
1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
According to O’Leary (2004:85) research methodology is a collection of classic ideas that will 
be used by the researcher when doing research. The following methodological framework was 
followed in this study: 
   
1.10.1 Research design and approach 
In the research design some decisions are made in terms of the study field to be investigated 
and the population to be used. It also entails deciding on which research methods to use and 
what the goal of the research should be (Babbie, 2011:179). Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee 
(2006: 71) define research design as a description of which actions must be performed to test a 
hypothesis in specific circumstances. According to TerreBlanche, Durrheim and Painter 
(2006:34), methods and techniques used by the researcher to collect and examine data in order 
to efficiently deal with the research problem are referred to as the research design.  
 
According to Creswell (2014:12), biography (the course of a person’s life), phenomenology 
(the study of structures of consciousness), grounded theory (forming of a theory), ethnography 
(the study and systematic recording of human cultures) and case study (intensive analysis of a 
person, group or situation) are all types of qualitative research designs. In this research, the 
researcher used a case study to inform the research problem. According to Lewis and 
McNaughton Nicholls (in Ritchie, Lewis, McNaughton Nicholls & Ormston, 2014:66) 
acknowledge case study usually falls within the ambit of qualitative research. Case study 





various perspectives originated from different accounts as people with different perspectives of 
the world are involved. Furthermore, not all case studies are equally complex. Some case 
studies might be less complex and use interviews of as few as two participants, while, on the 
other hand, it can also be so complex as to have interviews with 20 or more participants per 
case study. The latter might also incorporate documented data. According to Creswell 
(2014:241), in a case study the researcher explores a program, event, activity, process, or one 
or more individuals. The case for this study was the FAFI unit of the DPCI head office in 
Pretoria. This case study explored a particular activity in a specific context, meaning the 
investigation of money laundering conducted by FAFI investigators.  
 
Creswell (2014:4) states that the way people or groups feel about the social world and believe 
it are explored in qualitative research; therefore, in this study, qualitative research was done in 
this study. The researcher evaluated money laundering investigations conducted by DPCI FAFI 
investigators and used qualitative methods to discover what types of information can be 
extracted from the data collected by doing an in-depth examination of the member that were 
selected for this purpose (TerreBlanche et al., 2006:47).  
 
1.10.2 Target population and sampling 
A population is a large group of items or people on which the researcher will focus his attention 
and about which the researcher wants to find out more Bless et al. (2006:98). The ideal 
population for this study is the sum total of the DPCI FAFI investigators employed at branch 
offices nationally who investigate money laundering incidents. Each province has a DPCI FAFI 
branch office; however, it could not be confirmed how many DPCI FAFI investigators are 
operational nationally since the DPCI considered this information as confidential and refused 
to disclose this information to the researcher, irrespective of SAPS approval obtained to 
conduct this study. However, it was unrealistic to use the entire national population for the 
study and therefore it was narrowed down to a target population which consisted of 15 







As mentioned in paragraph 1.2.1, the DPCI has two units within the FAFI unit, namely the 
Financial Investigations Unit and the Asset Forfeiture Investigations Unit. Both these units 
collaboratively investigate money laundering cases, therefore no distinction is made in the 
sample of this study between these units. As a result, the FAFI unit in Pretoria was included as 
the target population.  
 
When a selection is made of only some of the research participants in the population by means 
of considering settings and events, and behaviour or social processes, it is referred to as 
sampling (TerreBlanche et al, 2006:48). When a sample has been selected, it is assumed that 
the members in this sample will be representative of the entire population of the study 
(Gravetter & Forzano, 2003:138).   
 
The researcher purposively selected the sample for this study as being investigators working in 
the FAFI unit and investigating money laundering cases handed to them and subsequently 
prosecuting such perpetrators. The researcher thus believes that these investigators have the 
required information to shed some light on the study. The sample consisted of 15 FAFI 
investigators that were purposely selected employed by the DPCI to perform investigations on 
money laundering cases. When the researcher forms an opinion of the characteristics of the 
representative sample it is known as purposive sampling (also known as judgemental sampling) 
(Bless et al., 2006:106). Gravetter and Forzano (2003:202) feel that the judgement of the 
researcher is the basis of purposive sampling as he selects the sample based on the people or 
items that exhibit most of the characteristics or features of the entire population. Because the 
members of a sample represent the entire population, the purpose of the research would be met..  
 
1.10.3 Data collection 
The steps for data collection demarcates the ways in which information will be collected and 
include collecting information through interviews, documents and visual materials, as well as 
establishing the protocol for recording information.  
 






1.10.3.1 Literature study 
Information for this study which relates to the topic was sought from various libraries. 
However, the researcher was unable to find information on the topic in libraries, and therefore, 
broke the topic down into different concepts such as ‘money laundering’ and ‘financial crime’. 
International and local literature was accessed to obtain information for the study, although 
there is little local literature on the topic.  
 
De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport (2005:96) state that literation should be obtain through 
a variety of methods. Other methods to search for literature have to be used to ensure that not 
only one method is depended on. Previous research can be used by a researcher as another 
method of research, as well as finding and documenting relevant literature (Welman & Kruger, 
2001:33). Welman and Kruger (2001:33) caution that libraries are not the only place where 
literature can be obtained. As a result, the researcher used the internet as another method to 
access the literature for the study. According to De Vos et al (2005:128), making use of the 
internet for research is faster than other methods of research and the internet is available 24 
hours per day with no limit to the length of time for which it can be used. Because of the vast 
amount of information available on the internet and the unlimited access available, research in 




According to Babbie and Benaquisto (2010:342), during qualitative interviews, the participant 
is free to give more detail in their responses to ensure a deeper knowledge of the issues. In this 
way, the participants can also steer the direction of the conversation. Gravetter and Forzano 
(2003:287) state that interviews are the most widely used method of data collection in 
qualitative research.  
 
The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews since it allowed participants to provide 
in-depth information from their personal experiences as financial and asset forfeiture 
investigators in money laundering investigations. The researcher compiled a standardised 





predetermined questions that addressed the research problem, research questions and research 
aim. In a semi-structured interview there are predetermined questions, but these are not asked 
strictly in a predetermined sequence as is the case in a structured interview. There is certain 
level of flexibility in this type of interview.  It also leaves the freedom to the participants to 
give open-ended answers to the questions asked Lewis-Beck et al (2004:1020). Pickett and 
Pickett (2002:160) are of the opinion that the best way to find out something is to ask someone 
in the know. Before commencement of the actual interviews, the researcher held pilot 
interviews with the participants. In these interviews the interview schedule as intended was 
used. The participants who participated in the pilot interview have extensive knowledge of and 
experience pertaining to financial investigations. Based on the feedback obtained from 
participants after testing the interview schedule, the final interview schedule was developed. 
The researcher asked consent from the interviewees to record the interviews on a voice 
recorder. This was done to do a proper analysis of the data obtained during the interviews at a 
later stage. The written consent of the participants was obtained for these voice recordings 
before the interviews started. The researcher made use of a voice recorder to record the 
interviews, with the view of transcribing such interviews for data analysis purposes, and 
obtained written consent from the research participants before commencing with the interviews. 
The interviews were conducted until saturation point had been reached. 
     
1.10.4 Data analysis 
During data analysis, the data are broken down into sections and examined in these different 
parts after which it is put together again (Creswell, 2014:1950). In the search for the answers 
to the research questions, the researcher sorts the data into different categories, ranks it, 
manipulates it and then summarises it (TerreBlanche et al., 2006:52; Gravetter & Forzano, 
2003:218). When doing this, the data will be a true reflection of the perceptions of the 
participants. According to TerreBlanche et al. (2006:52), data analysis is aimed at using data 
to answer the research question.  
 
Creswell (2013:82-188) explains the data analysis spiral, which method was used in this study 
for data analysis. In this spiral, data are first organised in a certain way. After this organisation, 





find the meaning of what the respondents said in each interview. After this, the data are broken 
down into various parts. In this study, the researcher wrote notes when she studied the data and 
in this way, the researcher classified the data into certain categories in which the study it. She 
developed strong descriptions of each of these categories and ranked the categories in themes. 
When all this was done, the researcher could interpret the views of the participants and link 
them to those in literature.  
 
1.10.5 Trustworthiness of the study 
Trustworthiness is very important in any research and in qualitative research, it is measured by 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability Guba and Lincoln (as cited in 
Kumar, 2011:184), which also indicate validity and reliability of the study. To ensure the 




Study participants are best equipped to tell whether what they feel and think are displayed in 
the findings of the research because the perceptions, experiences, feelings and beliefs of people 
are what are explored in qualitative studies. Hence, if there is a high level of participant 
similarity, it can be said that the quantitative research has credibility (or validity). In a 
qualitative study similarity can be measured by discussing the findings with the participants 
and if the level of similarity is high, the validity of the study is also high. (Kumar, 2011:185). 
  
To ensure that this study had a high level of credibility, the following validation strategies as 
set out by Creswell (2014:200) were used: 
 Triangulation: Evidence obtained was studied in this study was examined by comparing 
all the various sources used, after which an explanation was extracted from all the 
themes. The converging of several sources and perspectives of participants added value 
to the credibility of the study. 
 Member checking: The researcher presented the participants with the preliminary 






 Researcher bias: As explained right from the start, the researches brings to the study a 
certain amount of bias because of past experiences, expectations, preconceptions and 
orientations from her life thus far. These would have an influence in her interpretation 
of and approach to the study.  
 Prolonged time in the field: The researcher spent an extended time in the field to 
develop an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study that enabled her to 
convey detail about the participants that lend credibility to the narrative description.  
 
1.10.5.2 Transferability 
The researcher described the participants’ responses very well because she made use of their 
verbatim words. The details were connected with each other by the comprehensive details that 
were shared among all of them. In the discussion of the setting used for the research, the users 
of the research could almost feel one with the setting and in this way, shared experiences were 
created. Furthermore, the detailed description assisted the reader in deciding how transferable 
the findings were to the larger community. 
 
1.10.5.3 Dependability 
For the research to be dependable, the procedures followed were documented extensively by 
the researcher. This makes it possible for other researchers to use these same procedures. With 
the written consent of the participants, their responses were audio-taped and transcribed later. 
These transcripts were verified by the researcher for accuracy. 
 
1.10.5.4 Confirmability 
According to Trochim and Donnelly (as cited in Creswell, 2014:185), if the results of a study 
can be confirmed or substantiated by others, the research has a high level of confirmability. In 
this study, the process followed in linking the analysis of the findings, recommendations and 
conclusions to the original sources in which they were found was written down and kept for 
future purposes. Furthermore, the electronic data and transcriptions were secured so that only 






1.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In terms of research ethics, the researcher must handle all individuals affected by the results of 
their research studies honestly and with respect (Gravetter & Forzano, 2003:73). According to 
Yegedis, Weinbach and Myers (2012:29), the term ethics is derived from the Greek word ethos, 
which refers to the principles within a society that reflect what the society generally views as 
right or wrong behaviour. The researcher in the current study used  the Policy on Research 
Ethics of the University of South Africa (University of South Africa, 2007:7) to guide her in 
keeping the study ethical. In terms of this policy, the dignity, privacy and confidentiality of 
participants should be respected and kept at all times.  
 
The researcher adhered to the following ethical guidelines during this study: 
 
1.11.1 Informed consent 
In order to make it possible for the participants to make an informed decision regarding 
participation in the study, the researcher told them what the aim and purpose of the study is. To 
show that they had in fact consented to take part in the study, the participants had to sign 
informed consent forms, which indicated that they agreed to take part in the interviews and 
answer the questions. The participants were informed that they had the right to withdraw from 
the process at any time and that they did not have to give an explanation for their withdrawal. 
They were also informed that there would be no penalty or loss of benefit for them should they 
withdraw. Due to the voluntariness of participation, they were not entitled to any form of 
compensation or reimbursement for it. 
 
1.11.2 Protection from harm 
Participants remained anonymous to protect them from any unnecessary physical or 
psychological harm. The researcher treated the participants with dignity and respect. The 
interviews were conducted in a safe environment where the participants felt comfortable. 
Permission to conduct the study had to be obtained from the participants’ employer, which was 
done before commencement of the interviews. The researcher also made sure that she supplied 






1.11.3 Anonymity and confidentiality 
Confidentiality was guaranteed since participants remained anonymous. The information that 
was obtained from the participants was kept confidential and was not made available to anyone 
other than the researcher.    
1.11.4 Right to privacy 
The right to privacy of participants was respected and maintained. 
 
1.12 SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the general orientation of the study. This chapter provided an outline of 
the research methodology that was adhered to in order to respond to the research question. 
Accordingly, this chapter afforded the reader with an outline of the recognised research 
problem, the aim of the research and the subsequent research question. Furthermore, this 
chapter clarified the demarcation of the research and the purpose and value of the study. The 
research design and approach followed was described in sync with the related population and 
sampling method. Furthermore, the method of data collection and data analysis was reflected 
on, followed by the ethical characteristics followed in this research. Chapter 2 discusses the 







CHAPTER 2: THE INVESTIGATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Recommendation 30 of the FATF states that because financial investigations form a 
fundamental part of an all-inclusive crime prevention strategy, countries should continuously 
examine their law enforcement authorities that perform money laundering investigations to 
make sure that they remain within the framework of national AML/CFT policies. Furthermore, 
all inquiries that relate to crime with financial gain should be done by financial investigators 
(FATF, 2012a:8). 
 
Money laundering cannot take place on its own and there is always another criminal act 
involved in or underlying the process of money laundering. Such other act is called the 
predicate offence or the source of illegal financial gain. Fraud, theft, corruption, robbery, 
illegally operated gambling casinos, drug trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping, customs 
violation and illegal firearms trafficking are the crimes underlying money laundering. Because 
money laundering cannot take place in isolation, the investigation of money laundering cases 
must on finding the money trail and therefore focus on the predicate offence to find evidence 
of money laundering.  
 
This chapter outlines the legislative synopsis regulating money laundering and the proceeds of 
illegal activities, the Financial and Asset Forfeiture Unit, proceeds of unlawful activities, 
objectives of financial investigation, money laundering investigative strategy, parallel 
investigation in relation to financial investigation, process of conducting financial investigation 
and financial investigative techniques. The discussion that follows will focus on the legislation 








2.2 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK REGULATING MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND THE PROCEEDS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES  
South Africa has legislative frameworks that are in place for the prosecution of money 
laundering or the proceeds of illegal activities. Criminals continue to enjoy these proceeds even 
if they were found guilty for the offence committed, since they are not prosecuted for the 
proceeds derived from the crime committed. According to the SAPS (2013:1), the role of the 
financial investigator is clearly spelt out by legislation. The methods used for financial 
investigation can be used in any criminal investigation, but there are some Acts that leads the 
investigator to present the results of a financial investigation should a dispute arise. 
 
The Guidance Document: Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police 
Service, [sa]:8), the Standard Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: Information 
Note 3/1/5 (South African Police Service, 2010) and the Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015) set out the following 
legislation enacted by the government where specific financial investigations are required:  
    
2.2.1  Prevention of Organised Crime Act   
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA), No. 121 of 1998 (South Africa, 1998) was 
voted into law to assist in the fight against organised crime, money laundering, criminal gang 
activities and racketeering. In terms of this Act, the gains obtained through financial crimes can 
be recovered by means of civil and criminal forfeiture. The Mutual evaluation report: Anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (2009:3) the POCA, which came 
into effect on 21 January 1999, is the major Act in the combat against money laundering in 
South Africa. In terms of South Africa’s “all crimes” approach, the predicate offences involved 
in money laundering can also be prosecuted. The introduction of the POCA and the FICA (as 
discussed in section 2.2.4 below) has placed South Africa in line with the standards set by the 
(FATF). It is the introduction of these Acts that makes the effective investigation and 
prosecution of money laundering possible.  
 
There are three separate provisions of the POCA that make money laundering a criminal 





of property in a manner that is largely consistent with the 1988 United Nations (UN) 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna 
Convention) and the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo 
Convention) (Mutual evaluation report: Anti-money laundering and combating the financing 
of terrorism, 2009: 3). 
 
The POCA is used by the FAFI unit as a tool to remove the incentives of criminal activities 
which require financial investigation methodologies to help prove the crime. The legislation 
introduced a comprehensive asset forfeiture regime which has been successfully used by the 
AFU. The AFU comprises State Advocates and asset/financial investigators. The AFU assists 
the relevant authorities to recover the gains obtained from financial crime, but is does not 
prosecute criminal cases. An investigation into the allegations of illegal activities is done first, 
and then the assets and gains are tracked and recovered (SAPS, 2013:2). 
 
The POCA makes provision for the following two methods of seizing the assets or freezing the 
assets until the court finally decides whether the assets should be forfeited: 
 
Chapter 5 – Criminal forfeiture – based on UK system only after conviction 
Chapter 5 of the POCA provides for the criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of crime. It allows 
proceeds to be confiscated through a civil action after the accused has been convicted (NPA, 
[sa]:6-7). 
   
Chapter 6 – Civil forfeiture – based on USA system 
The POCA provides for the civil forfeiture of assets. Civil forfeiture states that the burden of 
proof lies on the state that a financial crime was committed. After the state has proven that the 
assets are the proceeds of a crime of were used to commit a crime, such assets can be recovered. 
The balance of probabilities of civil forfeiture can be used when there is enough evidence to 
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt (NPA, [sa]:7). 
 
The participants were asked the following question: “In your own words, explain what the 





question was to ascertain whether the participants are familiar with the mandate of this 
investigative unit. 
    
 Six participants were of the view that the mandate of the FAFI unit is to investigate how 
the money was moved and examine the documentation used for this moving in order to 
discover cases of money laundering. 
 Two participants mentioned that the unit is mandated to follow the proceeds of crime 
or illegal activities. 
 One participant indicated that the unit has to conduct parallel investigations to support 
criminal investigations. 
 In contrast, one participant pointed out that the unit’s mandate is to investigate the 
allegations in order to prove money laundering. 
 Two participants outlined the mandate of the FAFI unit as to investigate STRs, 
dishonest and fraudulent business dealings, illegal and criminal actions and the life 
styles of people involved. One of these two participants further indicated that the unit 
has to investigate all cases that might possibly be illegal in a financial sense by 
collecting and examining relevant evidence. 
 In contrast to the responses by the participants mentioned above, three participants were 
of the view that the unit is mandated to remove/seize the proceeds of crime in order to 
fight crime.  
 
The responses of the participants indicated that a minority of the participants are not clear about 
the mandate of the unit since they pointed out that the unit has to analyse the bank statements 
and follow the money acquired through illegal proceeds. The mandate of the unit is, however, 
to ensure that financial gain is taken out of crime by investigating, identifying, seizing and 
forfeiting the assets of criminals, as outlined in this study in section 1.2.1. 
 
The next discussion outlines the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004, 






2.2.2 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act  
The Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA), No. 12 of 2004 (South 
Africa, 2004b), was introduced in April 2004 in order to assist in the prosecution of corrupt 
activities by specific people and public officials. This Act states that when the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions has reasonable suspicion that a crime was committed, he can launch an 
investigation into the assets of the relevant individual. Section 20 of this Act creates an offence 
that overlaps with money laundering offences as per the POCA. According to Warren (2006:6), 
there is a connection between money laundering, bribery and corruption. However, this Act 
was not sufficient to fight these comprehensive financial crimes and therefore, the PRECCA 
was established (Cariston, Voker & Venter, 2011:71). The PRECCA makes the measures 
instituted to combat these crimes more enforceable. It also makes provision for the existence 
of corruption and related acts and provides investigative measures for the investigation of these 
crimes. In terms of the PRECCA, a register can be compiled which can place certain restrictions 
on identified individuals and organisations that have been found guilty and convicted of 
corruption in respect of tenders and contracts. The PRECCA also allows the state/FAFI unit to 
perform investigations into the wealth of individuals or organisations for which no reasonable 
explanation can be provided. However, such investigations must be based on a directive from 
a judge. 
 
The next discussion focuses on the implementation of the POCDATARA when conducting 
money laundering investigations. 
 
2.2.3  Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities 
Act 
Included in the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act (POCDATARA), No. 33 of 2004 (South Africa, 2004a), are all possible acts an 
individual or organisation can perform to conduct terrorist activities. The Act has been 
established to provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; to 
provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with terrorist 
activities; to provide for convention offences; to give effect to international instruments dealing 





of terrorist and related activities and to provide for investigative measures in respect of terrorist 
and related activities. Terrorists may engage in various crimes to fund their terrorist activities 
or they may use perfectly clean money to conduct terrorist activities. Charities are non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and due to the fact that they are in a sector that is not 
properly regulated, they become vulnerable to terrorist financing. Jorisch (2009:105) indicates 
that individual donors transfer large sums of money each year to charities, usually out of a 
genuine desire to help those in need. He further states that as a result of traditionally lax 
oversight, illicit actors are in an ideal position to exploit this goodwill for terrorism financing 
or other purposes. According to Cox (2011:162), because charities are dependent on donations 
from outside, it is easy for money launderers to use them for money laundering and terrorist 
financing. For this reason, they should be protected against such people. The POCDATARA 
enables the state/the FAFI unit to seize property that is associated with terrorist and related 
activities.  
 
The next discussion outlines the importance of the FICA in the investigation of money 
laundering.  
 
2.2.4 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA), No. 38 of 2001 (South Africa, 2001) was written 
to supplement the POCA. The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) is a national organisation 
that receives information when there is suspected or possible money laundering or terrorist 
financing. After receipt of this information, they distribute it to the relevant parties. Through 
the FIC, the country’s legislation on money laundering is brought into line with global 
standards. The centre came into being in 2003in terms of section 2 of the FICA to manage the 
FICA of 2001, as amended. One of the main priorities of the FIC is to identify gains from illegal 
activities and fight money laundering and other terrorist financing activities, as contemplated 
in section 3 of the FICA (South Africa, 2012:10). 
 





 To make information collected by it available to investigating authorities, supervisory 
bodies, the intelligence services and the South African Revenue Service with a view to 
facilitating the administration and enforcement of the laws of South Africa in general 
 To exchange information with bodies with similar objectives in other countries regarding 
money laundering activities, the financing of terrorist and related activities and similar 
activities 
 To supervise and enforce compliance with FICA or any directive made in terms of FICA 
and to facilitate effective supervision and enforcement by supervisory bodies 
 
In terms of the Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing legislation (South 
Africa, 2012: 10), the FIC has the following functions: 
 Process, analyse and interpret information disclosed to and obtained by it in terms of this act 
 Inform, advise and cooperate with investigating authorities, supervisory bodies, the South 
African Revenue Service and the intelligence services 
 Monitor and give guidance to accountable institutions, supervisory bodies and other persons 
regarding the performance of and compliance by them of their duties and obligations in 
terms of this Act or any directive made in terms of this Act 
 Retain the information all information received pursuant to compliance with the provisions 
of the FICA 
 
The FIC has no investigative powers or mandate. It collects and disseminates intelligence, not 
evidence. The FIC supplies the information they collected to other investigative authorities, 
SARS and the intelligence agencies upon the signature of any officer who is registered with the 
FIC and is authorised to sign such request. The FICA also provides for the FIC to send 
information to the SAPS and other law enforcement agencies regarding any suspicious and 
unusual transactions that require the use of financial investigation methodologies to develop a 
criminal case (SAPS, 2010:2).      
 
The FIC is an important source of information while conducting money laundering 
investigations as it has a database that makes it easier to access the information of an individual 





bank accounts opened by the individual, the travel information out of the Republic of South 
Africa and the information on assets owned by the individual. The information obtained from 
the FIC is only used as intelligence by the FAFI unit investigators. The investigators have to 
follow up on the information provided by the FIC by obtaining evidence in support of that, so 
that it can be admissible in a court of law.  
 
The next discussion outlines the legislative framework governing money laundering and the 
proceeds of illegal activities. 
 
Participants were asked to respond to the following question: “Are you familiar with the 
legislative framework governing money laundering and the proceeds of illegal activities?” The 
purpose of this question was to explore whether the participants are familiar with the legislation 
that legalise the investigation of money laundering. Participants’ responses are summarised 
below as follows: 
 
 Fourteen participants indicated that the POCA is the main legislation that governs 
money laundering. From these 14 participants, seven also pointed out that the POCA 
works in conjunction with the PRECCA and FICA. Six of the 14 participants further 
elaborated that sections 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter 3 of POCA are utilised in order to charge 
the person according to what he has done in the commission of crime and what he has 
benefitted from the crime.  
 In contrast with the above responses, one participant pointed out that the legislation 
which criminalises money laundering is the POCA of 1998. 
 
The responses given by participants led the researcher to believe that they are knowledgeable 
about the legislation controlling money laundering, although it is evident that some participants 
are not conversant with other applicable legislation, which clearly indicates that they only focus 
on the POCA while conducting money laundering investigations. None of the participants 







2.3 THE FINANCIAL AND ASSET FORFEITURE UNIT 
The charging and prosecution of criminals are some of the key responsibilities of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) of South Africa. Its mandate is set out in section 179(2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996) in terms of which the NPA can 
charge and prosecute criminals on behalf of the state and to take other actions related to 
instituting criminal proceedings. According to Cariston et al. (2011:147), the FAFI unit has 
been established in May 1999 to ensure that the powers stipulated in the POCA to seize criminal 
assets are used effectively to remove the profit of crime.  
 
This unit restricts and surrenders gains yielded from criminal activities and used in committing 
these crimes. When such moneys are forfeited, it is paid over to the Criminal Asset Recovery 
Account (CARA) in a manner which is explained by Geldenhuys (2016:23) or to the people 
identified to have suffered from these crimes. These moneys are also disseminated to law 
enforcement agencies that has as its aim to fight against organised crime, money laundering, 
criminal gang activity and crime in general, and to assist victims of crime.  
 
The Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police 
Service, 2015) prioritises training and development of FAFI investigators regarding these 
aspects as important for the effective functioning of investigators: 
 
▪ The FAFI unit has as its aim the upskilling of its members and giving them better 
investigating capabilities by providing focused training and resources to use in these 
investigations.  
▪ Priority 4 – Effectively training members of the FAFI to develop skills and knowledge 
▪ The proper training and development of members assigned to the component to 
provide members with the required, specialised skills and knowledge to conduct 
investigations into national priority offences. 
▪ Training exposure and positive engagements with other consultants, for example, 
training at tertiary institutions and benchmarking. 
▪ This document acknowledge insufficient subject-specific training for the skill 





The participants were asked the following question: “Have you undergone training to 
investigate money laundering? If affirmative, was the training intervention/s efficient or not?”  
The purpose of this question was to determine if the participants were fully equipped with the 
required skills and knowledge to efficiently investigate money laundering. Participants’ 
responses are summarised below as follows: 
   
 Fourteen participants pointed out that they have received training in the investigation 
of money laundering and indicated that the training was sufficient as it enabled them 
to: 
- investigate money laundering cases 
- differentiate money laundering investigations from criminal investigations 
- know how suspects conceal and spend the money obtained through illegal activities 
- compile subpoenas in terms of section 205 of the CPA and statements to be presented 
to the prosecutors 
- know how the illicit earnings of crime can be concealed through money laundering 
- conduct a financial and asset forfeiture investigation and obtain a clear understanding 
of the Public Finance Management Act. 
 
 One participant has not undergone any formal training course, but has attended weekly 
workshops, which were efficient because she has established that in most of the 
commercial crimes, there is money laundering, and she is able to identify the cases that 
have money laundering potential due to the informal training she received. 
 
From the participants’ responses to this question, it is evident that all participants have 
undergone some form of training in the investigation of money laundering, whether formal 
training courses or training workshop. The responses also indicated that money laundering 
investigation is different from criminal investigation, so it requires specialised investigators 
who have such skills and knowledge. However, from the participants’ responses it became 
evident that training interventions to investigate money laundering are limited to formal in-
house training courses and do not include exposure and positive engagements with other 





The following discussion outlines the proceeds of unlawful activities. 
 
2.4 THE PROCEEDS OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES 
Perpetrators are benefitting from the commission of crime they are involved in daily. The 
benefits that were obtained through crime can be regarded as proceeds of unlawful activities. 
The proceeds can be in the form of money, assets and properties, and are tainted or dirty 
considering the origin or source. According to Geldenhuys (2016: 20), the reach of POCA spans 
a wide range which includes many kinds of criminal activities, including commercial crime. 
POCA was established mainly to remove the incentive for criminal activity.  
 
2.4.1 Section 4 of POCA – Money laundering 
According to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Legislation (South 
Africa, 2012:143) in section 4 of the POCA provides that “a person is guilty of an offence if he 
or she knows or ought reasonably to have known that property is or forms part of the proceeds 
of unlawful activities, and commits an offence if he/she: 
 enters into any agreement, arrangement or transaction in connection with the property; 
 performs any other act in connection with the property; 
which has the effect or is likely to have the effect: 
 of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement 
of the property or the ownership of the property or any interest in the property; or  
 of enabling or assisting any person who committed an offence in South Africa or 
elsewhere: 
- to avoid prosecution; or 
- to remove or diminish any property acquired directly or indirectly as a result 
of an offence.” 
 
2.4.2 Section 5 of POCA – Assisting another to benefit from the proceeds of unlawful 
activities  
Section 5 of POCA provides that “a person commits an offence if he knows or ought reasonably 
to have known that another person has obtained the proceeds of unlawful activities and enters 





 in terms of which the retention or the control by or on behalf of that other person of the 
proceeds of unlawful activity is facilitated; or 
 in terms of which the proceeds are used: 
- to make funds available to that person; 
- to acquire property on his behalf; or 
- to benefit him in any other way.”  
 
Section 5 is aimed at any agreement, arrangement or transaction: 
 which is entered into by a person 
 which will assist another person to enjoy the benefits of proceeds of crime. 
 
2.4.3 Section 6 of POCA – Acquisition, possession or use of proceeds of unlawful 
activities  
Section 6 of POCA provides that “a person who: 
 acquires; 
 uses; or 
 possesses property; 
and who knows or ought reasonably to have known that it forms part of the proceeds of 
unlawful activities of another person, commits an offence under section 6 of POCA.” 
 
2.4.4 Penalties 
According to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Legislation (South 
Africa, 2012:145), an individual who is found guilty of an offence set out in section 4, 5 or 6 
of the POCA will have to pay a fine of no more that R100 million rand or will be incarcerated 
for not longer than 30 years.  
 







2.5   OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION 
According to the FATF (2012a:3), a financial investigation seeks to indicate that money has 
been moved in the course of the criminal activity and record this movement. The relation 
between the origin of the money, the persons who received it, when was it received and where 
it was kept, can be established and can provide valuable information. The FATF (2012a:6) 
further outlines the objectives of financial investigation as follows:  
 The identification of proceeds of crime, the tracing of assets and the confiscation of 
assets 
 The commencing with money laundering investigations  
 The exposure of or transnational organised crime and the gathering of knowledge 
on the modus operandi 
 
The SAPS (2013:1) states that financial investigations are performed to assist with the 
approaches to investigating financial crime in order to prove that a crime has been committed. 
It also uses documents obtained in the paper trail to pinpoint people or syndicates that were 
involved in the crime and obtain information on their whereabouts and involvement in the crime 
and in this way assist the investigation of the acts that lead to the money laundering. Financial 
investigations also make the forfeiture of gains obtained from the laundering possible.  
Furthermore, financial investigations produce strategic information to use in order to find out 
the extent of the gains obtained from the illegal activities, to find these properties and seize 
them (Pheijffer as cited in Jordaan, 2007:19). 
 
According to the International Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Course Manual 
(2007:6) “a financial investigation is conducted in order to: 
 determine the size and structure of an organisation 
 develop evidence that proves premeditation or the criminal intent of the subject 
 identify co-conspirators supplying or receiving money 
 uncover assets used to facilitate the crime.”  
 
It is further outlined in the FATF (2012a:9) that financial information can bring the following 





     “Identify motives, associations and links to people and places. 
 Identify the use of other services such as phones, transport and amenities relevant to 
the case. 
 Locate or identify suspects, witnesses or victims. 
 Provide information on a suspect’s movements. 
 Provide information to address the issue of prolific and priority offenders where no 
previous method has been successful. 
 Trace persons.” 
 
The primary objective of the FAFI unit is to contribute to the successful prevention, combating 
and investigation of national priority crime offences by conducting financial and asset forfeiture 
investigations (Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations Strategy 2015-2020, South 
African Police Service, 2015). 
 
The participants were asked the following question: “In your opinion, what are the objectives 
of a financial investigation?” The purpose of this question was to explore the participants’ 
opinion regarding the objectives of the financial investigation. Their responses are summarised 
as follows: 
     
 Eight participants were of the view that financial investigations are done to find out how 
financial crimes were committed, and where the gains from these crimes were moved 
to.. 
 Two participants felt that financial investigations are don to trace and identify the 
suspect by gathering the relevant information from different stakeholders. Analyse the 
evidence and confirm that the suspect has benefitted from the crime and present the 
findings to the prosecutors.  
 Two participants pointed out that a predicate offence has to be strengthened by 
analysing and interpreting the bank statements, and the money has to be followed in 





 In contrast to the responses above, two participants felt that the only reason for a 
financial investigation is to identify allegations of money laundering and then examine 
these allegations by means of a cash flow analysis. 
 One participant pointed out that the objective of financial investigation is to investigate 
national priority crimes related to finances. 
 
Upon analysis of the responses of the participants it was revealed that most of them did not 
really know what the reasons for doing financial investigations were. Most felt that such 
investigations only use bank statements of the alleged offenders in order to prove that a crime 
was committed. Not one of the participants thought that a financial investigation is supposed 
to support a criminal investigation in its attempts to prove that a crime was committed. 
Furthermore, the seizing of the gains obtained from such crimes were not mentioned by any of 
the participants. 
 
The money laundering investigative strategy is outlined in the next discussion. 
 
2.6 MONEY LAUNDERING INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGY  
Over the past couple of years, South Africa has built a strong and all-inclusive legislative 
structure to ensure that law enforcement agencies are able to investigate and prosecute cases of 
money laundering effectively. This legislative structure includes the POCA and the FICA, 
which are of the same standard as legislation in other countries and on par with the standards 
set by the FATF (FAFI Guidance Document [sa]). 
  
According to the Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South 
African Police Service, 2015), the investigative concept of the FAFI model is based on the 
following: 
 Taking away the gains to be made from illegal activities in an attempt to stop them 
from doing it again. 
 Finding evidence to produce a profile of economic activity associated with the 





 Removing the proceeds and benefit from crime leaving the criminal powerless and 
economically vulnerable. 
 Ensuring convictions of money laundering and ensuring devotion of forfeited assets 
to the combating of crime.  
 
The participants were asked the following question: “Do you experience 
challenges/shortcomings to effectively investigate money laundering?” The purpose of this 
question was to examine if the participants encounter challenges in the investigation of money 
laundering. A summary of the responses from the participants is outlined below: 
      
All the participants agreed that they do experience challenges in the investigation of money 
laundering, except one participant who pointed out that she has never encountered any 
challenges while conducting investigations. The participants’ motivation for their answers 
included the following: 
 Resistance from the referring units due to the fact that they do not understand the 
mandate of FAFI. 
 There is no good relationship with the criminal investigators who are referring the 
matters for money laundering investigation. 
 Some of the criminal investigators from the referring units within the DPCI, the 
members from the stations and members of the public have no clear understanding and 
knowledge of money laundering. 
 Late referrals of cases to FAFI only to find that the case has been on the court roll for a 
prolonged period. When the financial investigation is complete and presented to the 
prosecutors to add money laundering charges to the predicate offence, the prosecutors 
indicate that the charge sheet has already been drawn, therefore, no other charges will 
be added. 
 Criminal investigators providing incomplete information of the suspects. For example, 
an incomplete ID number of the suspect, which will cause a delay in the investigation 
since there is nothing that can be conducted without the ID number. 
 It takes time to process information requested from other stakeholders and feedback is 





 STR investigations do not yield any positive results due to the fact that the magistrates 
are reluctant to authorise the subpoenas in terms of section 205 of the CPA, indicating 
that there is no case docket which has been registered; in other words, no crime has been 
committed. The investigators always compile the report of the findings of the 
investigation indicating the money laundering offences, but they are turned away by the 
magistrates. 
 Financial institutions, especially the banks, keeping record only for a specific time. For 
example, a case is reported after ten years and the request is made at the bank for the 
opening documents and statement of the bank account being investigated. The banks 
keep the records for a minimum of five years, so only the bank statements will be 
obtained with no documents of the account holder. This makes investigation difficult 
since in such cases, the culprit is unknown. 
 Prosecutors are reluctant to add money laundering charges, alleging that money 
laundering investigations will take long and delay the process of prosecuting the 
predicate offence. 
 
From the participants’ responses to this question, it was evident that there are various challenges 
experienced by FAFI investigators when investigating money laundering. Investigators are not 
guided by the prosecutors during the process of investigation. 
 
The following discussion outlines parallel investigations in relation to financial investigation. 
 
2.7 PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS IN RELATION TO FINANCIAL 
INVESTIGATION  
Where financial investigations are concerned, a parallel investigation is used as it investigates 
the predicate offence simultaneously with the money laundering offence (FAFT, 2012a:9). 
When these two types of investigations are used simultaneously they complement each other 
and lead to a more comprehensive investigation of a crime. It is stipulated in SAPS (2015:8) 
that it is essential that the investigating officers in the criminal case, the financial investigation 
and the asset forfeiture investigation work together during the course of an investigation. It 





investigating officer, but is rather a team effort without duplication, since each discipline has a 
different focus of investigation. 
 
The researcher is of the opinion that one of the responsibilities of the criminal investigating 
officer is to investigate a crime in order to gather sufficient evidence to prove the guilt or 
innocence of a suspect. The financial investigating officer will conduct investigations into 
money laundering offences by performing lifestyle audits and investigating suspicious 
transaction reports. The investigative units within the DPCI refer their matters to the FAFI unit 
for financial and asset forfeiture investigations and, by doing so, both the investigative units 
share information about their investigations. This is done during the operational meetings 
where all the stakeholder involved in the investigation give feedback.  
 
Based on experience, the researcher is of the opinion that the authorities tasked with law 
enforcement must make use of a parallel investigation to prove that the money laundering or 
terrorist financing have taken place, while the financial investigation tries to prove that the 
proceeds have been moved during the crime as well as to find where it has been moved to. 
When it is established what the connection is between the origin of the money, to whom it was 
transferred when, and where it went from there, proof of criminal activity can be obtained.  
 
2.8 THE PROCESS OF CONDUCTING FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION 
The FATF (2012a:6) states that the process of financial investigation includes the gathering, 
organising and analysing of the information available, as it is only by doing this that prosecution 
for a crime can be done, and the seizing of the proceeds can take place. There are no records or 
literature in South Africa, which indicates how money laundering should be investigated. 
According to the researcher, it is the responsibility of the financial investigators to collect 
information that will assist in the investigation of money laundering. The operational units 
within the DPCI are responsible for the investigation of these cases. Cases where there is a 







According to the South African Police Service ([sa]), when a matter is referred to the FAFI unit 
the following should be used as a guideline: 
 The value involved in the criminal case 
 The complexity of the criminal case 
 Public interest 
 Interest of justice 
 Whether there is asset forfeiture potential 
 Whether there is money laundering potential 
 Whether a suspect has been identified 
 Organised crime groups 
 
The research participants were asked the following question: “According to you, what is your 
role and responsibilities as a financial and asset forfeiture investigator during the investigation 
of money laundering?” The question wanted to evaluate whether the participants are clear about 
and well conversant with their mandate and job descriptions. Participants’ responses were 
summarised as follows: 
    
 Six participants pointed out that after receiving a case docket from the referring units, they 
ensure that the case has financial investigation potential. Profiling is conducted on the 
suspects and if it appears that there is a suspicion, an application is made in terms of section 
205 of the CPA for bank statements in order to follow the trail of money. Bank statements 
and the other information gathered are analysed to establish who benefitted from the crime 
and how the dirty money was cleaned using the three stages of money laundering. A report 
with regard to the findings is compiled and presented to the prosecutor to add the money 
laundering charges to the predicate offence. Two of the six participants further pointed out 
that they are responsible for investigating STRs, conducting lifestyle investigations and 
testifying in court. 
 In contrast, two participants were of the opinion that the role of financial investigators is to 
assist the criminal investigation by ensuring that the proceeds of crime are followed by 





previously, a person was only charged for a predicate offence like fraud, corruption or theft 
but not for money laundering. 
 One participant indicated that the role of the financial investigator is to look in detail into 
the flow of money when it is paid into the bank accounts. It should be proven that money 
laundering took place and the red flags in those bank accounts should be showed.  
 One participant pointed out that a financial investigator, in collaboration with the NPA, 
should find the assets obtained through money laundering and then then seize and forfeit it. 
 Three participants indicated that the role of the financial investigator is to determine what 
happened to the proceeds of crime and identify people who benefitted from that crime. 
 One participant indicated that his role as a financial investigator is to give a clear picture to 
the court of how the proceeds of unlawful activities were utilised. 
 One participant was of the view that a financial investigator should find evidence that 
proceeds have been yielded by means of money laundering, identify the source of the 
money and determine whether the money was obtained legally or illegally. 
 
It appeared from the responses that the majority of the participants are familiar with their roles 
and responsibilities as financial investigators, although some could not explain their role in 
detail; but the fact of the matter is that they have an understanding that the money trail should 
be followed to prove money laundering. The emphasis is on the analysis of bank statements. 
 
The following discussion focuses on the referral of cases to FAFI for investigation. 
 
2.8.1 Referral of cases to the FAFI unit 
Requests are received for internal financial investigation from the following units: 
 Commercial Crime Investigation 
 Organised Crime Investigation 
 Anti-Corruption Investigation 
 Detective Service Investigators 
 Crime Intelligence and Protection Services 
 Individual Investigators 





Requests received for external financial investigation support from other law enforcement 
agencies/government stakeholders are as follows: 
 South African Revenue Services (SARS) (Customs) 
 Financial Services Board (FSB) 
 South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
 Environmental Crime Management 
 FIC 
 NPA (Mainstream prosecutions) 
 NPA-AFU 
 Metro Police 
 
International requests guided by multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements are as follows: 
 Police to police 
 Eastern and Southern Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) 
 FATF 
 Camden Asset Recovery Interagency Network (CARIN) 
 Asset Recovery Interagency Network of Southern Africa (ARINSA) 
 Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) 
 
When the FAFI unit receives the requests for financial investigation from the units mentioned 
above, such information is recorded and a determination is made regarding whether the request 
has potential for a financial investigation. If there is potential for a financial investigation, an 
enquiry file is opened and allocated to the investigator for investigation.  
 
In addition, participants were asked the following question: “According to you, what are the 
reason/s for the low conviction rate of money laundering?” The purpose of this question was 
to explore the factors resulting in the low conviction rate of money laundering. In summary, 
the participants responded as follows to this question: 
    
 Fourteen participants believed that prosecutors contribute to the low conviction rate of 





- Prosecutors are reluctant to add money laundering charges to the predicate offence. 
- Lack of knowledge by some of the magistrates and prosecutors about money 
laundering. 
- Prosecutors are not prepared for lengthy trials, so they are apprehensive to prosecute 
money laundering charges. 
- The accused are usually advised by their legal representatives and prosecutors to 
enter into a plea bargain so that they can be convicted for a predicate offence and 
receive lighter sentences, while money laundering charges will be removed. 
- Prosecutors are alleging that money laundering will prolong the trial and 
prosecution. 
- Prosecutors do not know what is involved in money laundering and that different 
people can be charged with money laundering offences according to what they have 
contributed to and benefitted from the crime. 
- When prosecutors have indicated that there are no money laundering charges, there 
is nothing more that the investigators will do. 
- One participant pointed out that he has investigated a Free State case where 291 
charges of money laundering were proven, but it took him half a day to convince 
the prosecutor to add money laundering charges. 
- Investigators work very hard to prove money laundering, but cases are occasionally 
dismissed by prosecutors. 
 In contrast to the participants’ responses outlined above, one participant disagreed by 
pointing out that investigators are not properly trained to investigate money laundering 
and this leads to insufficient evidence being presented to the prosecutors. He further 
mentioned the fact that the unit is understaffed and the work volume is very high. 
 One participant pointed out that criminal investigators are not interested in money 
laundering charges; they only concentrate on the predicate offence. 
 
It appears from the participants’ responses, that even though they perform money laundering 
investigations to the best of their abilities and consequently provide sufficient evidence that 
such crime has been committed challenges exist in the prosecution of money laundering charges 





2.8.2 Investigation plan 
The investigator will acknowledge the receipt of request for investigation and then compile an 
investigation plan in order to address the following (FAFI Standard Operating Procedure for 
Investigating Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 (South African Police Service, 2010:9)): 
 Collect available information 
 Draw a basic financial profile by the identification of sources (systems search) 
 Analyse products of search 
 Determine the financial investigation required  
 Schedule dates according to tasks to be performed 
 Identify internal and external role players in financial investigation 
 Define objectives of the investigation/outcomes 
 
The next discussion outlines the sources of information while conducting a money laundering 
investigation. 
 
2.8.3  Gathering of information 
Financial investigators need to collect and gather information about the targets under 
investigation. The collection of such information is not simple because the information has to 
be admissible in court, therefore it needs to be obtained legally. Criminals are always one step 
ahead of law enforcement with their techniques of hiding the proceeds of crime, which makes 
the task of law enforcers to trace these proceeds very difficult. Criminals usually hide their 
assets or proceeds of crime by registering them in other family members’ or their attorneys’ 
names in an attempt to avoid prosecution. The following requests/statements are compiled in 
order to obtain information: 
    
 According to section 205(1) of Juta Statutes Editors (2012:181-182), “a regional court 
magistrate or a magistrate may, upon the request of a Director of Public Prosecutions 
or a public prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, require the attendance before him or her or any other judge, regional court 
magistrate or magistrate, for examination, of any person who is likely to give material 





Procedure Act of 1977 states than “an investigator has to compile a statement, which 
will be signed by the prosecutor and authorised by the magistrate.” For example, a 
subpoena in terms of section 212 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 is compiled 
and authorised by the magistrate in order to be submitted to the financial institutions 
and other institutions for information. Information from the financial institutions could 
be bank statements, which will indicate the movement of funds in the account. In 
addition, information could also be obtained from other institutions, for example motor 
dealerships on how a suspect’s vehicle/s were purchased, and information from the 
deeds office on how a suspect’s properties have been purchased. The following entities 
could serve as sources of information:   
    
 FIC 
 South African Banks Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) 
 NPA to SARS – sharing of information in terms of a section 73 request 
 Companies and Intellectual Properties Commission (CIPC) 
 South African Insurance Crime Bureau (SAICB) 
 
According to the FATF (2012a:18), law enforcement and competent authorities can use the 
following sources of information in furtherance of financial investigations: 
 
2.8.3.1  Criminal records and intelligence  
Some types of information used in proving that criminal activity has taken place are criminal 
records and intelligence (obtainable from banks); information on previous arrests, prosecutions, 
sentences; as well as possible linkages with known criminals (all obtainable from the SAPS 
Criminal Record Centre database).  
 
2.8.3.2  Financial information  
In order to understand the nature of and resources used in criminal activities, financial 
information is used, which is information on the operations of the relevant entities. It includes 





collected in the context of meeting customer due diligence. Such financial information is also 
helpful in predicting future activity and to find the assets obtained.  
 
2.8.3.3  Classified information  
Classified information is information that the state regards as sensitive and it must be protected. 
It includes information on terrorist financing and is kept for national security. In terms of law, 
only certain people or organisations can obtain access to such information. 
 
2.8.3.4  Open source   
This type of information can be obtained by means of sources that are open to anybody to use, 
for instance the internet, all kinds of media (social, print and electronic), and public and private 
registries. 
 
2.8.3.5  Regulatory information 
Regulatory information is information that is maintained by regulatory agencies; access is 
typically restricted to official use only. This category of information could be held by central 
banks, tax authorities and other revenue collecting agencies.  
 
The study participants were asked the following question: “In your opinion, are you empowered 
with sufficient resources to effectively investigate money laundering?” The purpose of this 
question was to identify whether the participants are well equipped with resources to enable 
them in the investigation of money laundering. Participants’ responses to this question are 
summarised below: 
    
 All the participants agreed that they have sufficient resources which enable them to 
properly conduct money laundering investigations. The participants’ motivation to their 
answers included the following: 
- High scanning machines are available that can extract bank statements data from 
PDF into Excel spreadsheets, which makes analysing of the bank statements easier. 
- Internet access 





- All the participants have laptops 
- Access to profiling systems 
- All the participants are issued with cellular phones 
- Guidance from the commercial crimes advocates 
- Access to analyst notebook to link the suspects with their associates and properties 
- Investigation is mostly conducted in the offices as bank statements have to be 
interrogated 
 In contrast, three participants also raised the concern that the resources are partly 
sufficient. The motivation for their answers is offered below: 
- Software in place needs to be developed due to the fact that technology is ever 
changing. 
- Shortage of manpower resulting from promotions where experienced investigators 
left the unit and are not replaced. 
- Criminals are always knowledgeable about the methods of hiding assets and the 
proceeds of illegal activities.  
 
It appeared from the participants’ responses, that the investigators have sufficient resources to 
investigate money laundering effectively. 
 
The following discussion focuses on the financial investigative techniques. 
 
2.9 FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 
Recommendation 31 of the FATF (2012a:25-28) states that there are many different ways in 
which criminal activities can be investigated. These include undercover operations, tapping of 
communications and computers, or controlled delivery. The following investigative techniques 
are highlighted in this report: 
 Physical surveillance: This method assists in obtaining information about an 
individual’s/business’s movements and relations. When suspects are observed, it 
might be possible to find where records relating to financial crime are kept, validate 





 Trash runs: This involves searching through the suspect’s trash because people 
sometimes throw away things that could be used as evidence in a financial 
investigation. It might be possible to find in the trash indications of where proceeds 
from crime might be kept. 
 Interviews: Investigators should arrange interviews with suspects in order to obtain 
statements from them, to gather evidence or to remind investigators and witnesses of 
the events that took place in the course of criminal activities. 
 Controlled delivery: This technique in used when illegal imports, money or monetary 
instruments that were discovered in the course investigation and prosecution of 
financial crime, are shipped to a suspected violator while such suspect is being 
watched by law enforcement officers. When performing controlled deliveries, it is 
possible to: 
     
- find out who the possible criminals are 
- interrupt organisations while smuggling illegal substances, money or other assets 
across borders 
- enlarge the investigation and in this way find other criminals possibly of a higher 
level and obtain evidence 
- obtain tangible proof that the criminals were aware of the fact that they were in 
possession of substances or money 
- find the proceeds so obtained in order to seize it. 
     
 Intercepting communications: Tapping into suspects’ electronic communications such 
as internet, cable, telephonic or fibre-optic communications and using devices to track 
their movements can assist in identifying co-perpetrators, becoming aware of criminal 
operations and finding instantaneous evidence that could assist in finding the assets, 
financial records and other evidence. 
 Undercover operation: Although this technique is truly helpful in a financial 
investigation, it has some inherent risks. In an undercover operation any person working 
for a law enforcement agency obtains information under the control of the law 





 Methods of proving income: It is often helpful in the financial investigation to establish 
the amount of proceeds derived from illegal activity, as this could indicate why the 
crime was committed and give circumstantial evidence of the predicate offence.  
 Compulsory measures to obtain evidence: When the means mentioned above, do not 
lead to any evidence of criminal activity, it would be necessary to resort to compulsory 
measures to obtain evidence, such as using search warrants and other instruments.  
 
The FAFI Standard Operating Procedure for Investigating Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 
(South African Police Service, 2010:16) clearly sets out various financial investigative 
strategies that should be followed when conducting financial investigation. These strategies 
include profiling; formalised analysis practices; for example, linkage analysis and network 
analysis; data analysis software that can provide investigators with a trial of evidence that 
money laundering was committed; data mining software applications available to investigators 
to assist with investigations and public and non-public records that can assist an investigator 
with information about a person or business. I addition, this document further sensitises 
investigators to use the services of service providers to gather information when conducting 
financial investigation, such as telecommunication and financial service providers. Moreover, 
this document advocates the collection of information from government and non-government 
organisations, such as credit bureaus, the deeds office, the Home Affairs office, the SABRIC, 
the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), as part of 
the FAFI investigative strategy.    
 
Participants were asked this question: “What investigative technique/s or strategy do you use 
during the investigation of money laundering?” The purpose of this question was to ascertain 
whether the participants are using any investigative techniques while conducting money 
laundering investigations. The responses are summarised below: 
     
 All the participants stated that bank statements are the main technique they use during 
the investigation by making an application of section 205 subpoenas in terms of the 
CPA from the banks. The bank statements are analysed in order to establish the flow of 





possible for them to establish where the money came from and where it went to. People 
who benefitted from the proceeds of crime can be detected through bank statement 
analysis. 
 Three of the participants also pointed out that interviews are conducted with the 
witnesses or the people who benefitted from the crime and their statements are obtained. 
 Seven participants added that profiling of the suspects and of their family members is 
done to establish the properties that were acquired through the illegal proceeds. 
 Four participants also indicated that requests of information about the suspects are made 
from different stakeholders like: Home Affairs, FIC, SABRIC, CIPC, movement 
control, conveyances and dealerships. 
 In contrast, three participants further pointed out that the findings of the analysis are 
presented to the prosecutors, and the criminal investigators are also updated about the 
findings.  
  
The responses of the participants clearly indicated that investigators do not use a range of 
investigative techniques while conducting money laundering investigations and it is clear that 
the participants cannot differentiate between investigative techniques and the methods used to 




To deal effectively with crime, it must become true that “crime does not pay”. If we are able to 
fight and combat money laundering, crime can be reduced and criminals can be weakened by 
applying the legislation regulating money laundering and the proceeds of illegal activities. The 
methodology of financial and asset forfeiture investigations as a supporting tool for criminal 
investigations is a dynamic evolution in the field of investigation. The FAFI unit has to be 
considered to assist with the dismantling of organised crimes and the successful forfeiting of 
the proceeds of crime. This can be achieved through the use of the FAFI unit and applying the 
legislation which legalises money laundering investigation. The FAFI unit as a specialised unit 
needs dedicated capacity of financial investigators due to the nature and the extent of the types 





Criminals do not always regard a jail sentence as punishment. It is merely seen as part of the 
job. However, they want to know that their families are well taken care of while they are 
incarcerated and that they will be rich upon their release (NPA: Asset forfeiture unit, 2004:5). 
Removing the profits of illegal activities and putting the families of perpetrators on the street 
will cause a real problem for the criminals compared to spending a sentence in prison. Criminals 
find it difficult to forfeit the assets derived from illegal activities. They are willing to serve their 
jail sentence, irrespective of the years, but not to forfeit the assets. 
 
The objectives of financial investigation have been outlined as finding and confiscating the 
gains obtained from financial crimes. The task of law enforcement agencies is made easier by 
the POCA and the FICA as these regulate the investigation and prosecution of money 
laundering. As already mentioned, parallel investigations are performed to ensure that the crime 
is investigated at all levels.  
 
The process of conducting financial investigation has been outlined as the collection, collation 
and analysis of available information with a view to assisting in the prosecution of crime and 
taking away the proceeds of crime. Chapter 3 presents the study findings and consequent 







CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The researcher evaluated the investigation of money laundering. This evaluation was 
benchmarked against the literature review conducted, participants’ feedback as well as the 
DPCI FAFI primary directives, including the FAFI Standard Operating Procedure for 
Investigating Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 (South African Police Service, 2010), the 
FAFI Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015) and the 
Guidance Document: Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police 
Service, [sa]. These directives set out financial investigative methodology procedures to ensure 
the smooth handling of processes in financial investigation and it gives direction and provide 
guidelines to assist the operational components of the DPCI FAFI to do investigations into 
financial deals and losses of assets in an effective and efficient manner. 
 




Chapter 1 outlined the general orientation of the study as well as the background of the DPCI 
and the mandate of the FAFI unit. The problem statement, the aim, purpose and research 
question of the study were also identified and presented. 
 
The aim of this study was 
▪ To evaluate the investigation of money laundering investigations conducted at the DPCI 
FAFI unit in Pretoria.  
 
The purpose of the study was: 
 To determine whether the DPCI FAFI unit is achieving its proposed investigative 






 To identify and describe challenges/shortcomings experienced by the DPCI FAFI 
investigators to effectively investigate money laundering. 
 
The following primary research question was posed and adequately addressed: 
 What are the challenges/shortcomings experienced by DPCI FAFI investigators in the 
effective investigation of money laundering? 
 
The target population and the sample drawn for the study were investigators from the DPCI 
FAFI unit in Pretoria. The research methodology used in this study was discussed. This chapter 
concluded with the ethical considerations as guided by the Policy on Research Ethics of the 
University of South Africa. 
 
Chapter 2 outlined the legislative synopsis regulating money laundering and the proceeds of 
illegal activities. Various aspects related to money laundering were further discussed and 
included the following: the mandate of the FAFI unit, proceeds of unlawful activities, 
objectives of financial investigation, money laundering investigative strategy, parallel 
investigation in relation to financial investigation, process of conducting financial investigation 
and financial investigative techniques. 
 
3.3 FINDINGS 
In order to address the study’s research question relating to the challenges/shortcomings 
experienced by DPCI FAFI investigators in the effective investigation of money laundering, 
the following research findings are made. These research findings are based on empirical data 
obtained from the semi-structured interviews conducted with DPCI FAFI investigators.  
 
3.3.1 Findings on participants’ familiarity with the legislative framework governing 
money laundering and the proceeds of illegal activities  
 
 The majority of the participants recognised the POCA as the primary legislation that 





 Participants are not entirely conversant with legislative framework applicable to the 
investigation of money laundering, other than the POCA. The Guidance Document: 
Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police Service, [sa]:8), 
the Standard Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 
(South African Police Service, 2010) and the Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015) clearly set out 
the POCDATARA, PRECCA and FICA promulgated by the government, which 
activate the role of the financial investigator. However, a number of participants did not 
recognise these acts as primary pieces of legislation that govern money laundering. 
 Fewer than half of the participants acknowledged that the POCA should also be 
interpreted in conjunction with the PRECCA and FICA when investigating money 
laundering. The ignorance of the other investigators pertaining to the PRECCA and 
FICA thus questions these investigators’ knowledge of these pieces of legislation and 
its value in financial investigations.     
 
3.3.2 Findings on participants’ skills and knowledge to efficiently investigate money 
laundering cases 
 
 Participants have undergone some form of training, whether formal training courses or 
training workshops, in the investigation of money laundering. However, training 
interventions to investigate money laundering are limited to formal in-house training 
courses and do not include exposure and positive engagements with other consultants, 
for example, training at tertiary institutions and benchmarking.   
 
3.3.3 Findings on participants’ familiarity with the mandate of the Financial and Asset 
Forfeiture Investigative Unit 
 
 Participants’ understanding of the mandate of the FAFI unit differs and it is evident that 
they are not fully knowledgeable of this unit’s mandate. Most of the participants 
correctly outlined the mandate of FAFI as to investigate the flow of funds and to follow 





understanding of the FAFI unit’s mandate are thus limited when taking into 
consideration the unit’s mandate as illustrated in the DPCI FAFI Guidance Document: 
Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police Service, [sa]:8), 
the Standard Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 
(South African Police Service, 2010), as well as the Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015), as illustrated 
in section 1.2.1. 
 
3.3.4 Findings on participants’ knowledge regarding the objectives of a financial 
investigation 
 
The majority of the participants have no clear understanding of the objectives of financial 
investigation. Most of the participants placed the emphasis solely on the analysis of bank 
statements. None of the participants mentioned that the ultimate goal of the financial 
investigation is to assist in the criminal investigation to help prove the crime. Participants also 
did not mention the confiscating of the properties believed to be the proceeds of crime after a 
cash flow analysis has been done. 
 
3.3.5 Findings on participants’ challenges experienced in the investigation of money 
laundering 
 
The following challenges as experienced by FAFI investigators emerged in the investigation of 
money laundering: 
 
 According to participants, prosecutors generally are reluctant to add the money 
laundering charges to the predicate offence citing that money laundering is too complex 
to prosecute and it takes too long to prosecute. 
 
 The poor relationship between FAFI investigators and criminal investigators is not 






 The late referral of cases to FAFI by referring units makes it difficult for FAFI 
investigators to expedite the investigation, bearing in mind that the predicate offence is 
already on the court roll.  When the financial investigation is concluded and the findings 
presented to the prosecutors to add money laundering charges, they are turned down by 
the prosecutors stating that the charge sheet has already been drafted. 
 
 Criminal investigators supply incomplete information, which causes a delay in the 
investigation. 
 
 Feedback is not always received timeously from the stakeholders whereby requests are 
made for information. 
 
 The investigation of STRs does not yield positive results, since magistrates are often 
reluctant to authorise subpoenas for obtaining documents from various institutions, 
indicating that no crime was committed. 
 
 Financial institutions keeping record for specific a period of time; for example, banks 
keep records for only five years.  When the case is reported after a long time, there is a 
possibility that some of the information would not be obtainable. 
 
3.3.6 Findings on the role and responsibilities of financial and asset forfeiture 
investigators during the investigation of money laundering 
 
 The majority of the participants indicated that after receiving the case docket, they 
analyse it to establish if the facts presented indicate money laundering activity, conduct 
profiling, apply for bank statements and conduct an analysis. A report on the findings 
is compiled and presented to the prosecutor outlining the flow of funds. 
 
 The minority of the participants outlined that they are responsible for investigating 






3.3.7 Findings on contributing factors resulting in the low conviction rate of money 
laundering 
 
 Most of the respondents felt that not many money laundering cases are convicted 
because prosecutors think that adding charges of money laundering to the initial 
predicate offence would make the trial last longer and therefore do not want to add 
these charges.1.  
 Some participants believe many prosecutors do not really understand what money 
laundering as well as the legislation directing it entails. They also do not know that this 
legislation can be used to charge other persons for to their involvement in the 
commission of crime. 
 Accused persons are encouraged by prosecutors to enter into a plea bargain whereby 
they will only be prosecuted for the predicate offence, and not money laundering also. 
 FAFI inputs are ignored by prosecutors, even though the evidence is presented to court 
that the crime of money laundering has been committed. 
 One participant pointed out that some of the investigators are incompetent in the 
investigation of money laundering.  There is a lack of skills and knowledge. 
 
3.3.8 Findings on the adequacy of resources to effectively investigate money 
laundering 
 
 All the participants outlined that the physical resources at their disposal are sufficient 
to effectively perform their duties. 
 
 Few participants raised the shortage of human resources as a challenge as this hampers 
the investigation, indicating that the posts of members who left the unit were never 
filled. 
                                                            
1 The NPA did not form part of the sample of this study, therefore these statements by participants cannot be 
tested with prosecutors. All statements made by participants involving prosecutors are presented solely based on 





3.3.9 Findings on the investigative technique/s used during the investigation of money 
laundering 
 
 The majority of the participants viewed the analysis of bank statements as the main 
technique to utilise during a money laundering investigation. 
 
 The minority participants have pointed out that interviews are conducted with the 
witnesses to obtain information on how they benefitted from the crime. 
 
 It has been established that limited investigative techniques are utilised by investigators 
since they lack knowledge of other investigative techniques. 
 
3.4  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The researcher makes the following recommendations after consideration of the findings 
discussed above: 
 
3.4.1 Recommendations on participants’ familiarity with the legislative framework 
governing money laundering and the proceeds of illegal activities 
 
▪ An assessment pertaining to DPCI FAFI investigators’ knowledge of the relevant 
legislation governing money laundering should be carried out in order to establish the 
challenges and shortcomings with regard to the interpretation of relevant legislation 
with particular focus on in-service and external training in the money laundering 
legislative framework. 
 
 According to the FAFI Strategic Planning (2015: 9-10), specific portions of legislation 
provide for offences and asset forfeiture processes that will be dealt with by the FAFI 
investigators. Consequently, DPCI FAFI investigators should be familiarised with the 









- POCDATARA  
- FICA 
- The International Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act 
 
3.4.2 Recommendations on participants’ skills and knowledge to efficiently investigate 
money laundering cases 
 
 The skills and investigating capabilities of FAFI investigators should be enhanced 
through focused training and development to equip investigators with the required 
specialised skills and knowledge to investigate national priority offences, such as 
money laundering. In addition, the performance of these investigators should also be 
monitored and interventions implemented where required.    
 
 Investigators attached to the DPCI FAFI unit should be exposed to external subject-
specific training interventions in their external environment. Consequently, positive 
engagements with external consultants, for example, training at tertiary institutions and 
benchmarking, would be facilitated.  
 
 Training programmes should be designed in such a way that sufficient time is allocated 
for investigators to acquire the skills and knowledge about the investigation of money 
laundering. 
 
▪ Official DPCI FAFI directives and investigative methodologies, such as the Guidance 
Document: Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police 
Service, [sa]), the Standard Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: 
Information Note 3/1/5 (South African Police Service, 2010) and the Financial and 
Asset Forfeiture Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 
2015) should be reviewed continuously to benchmark international best practices in the 





3.4.3 Recommendations on participants’ familiarity with the mandate of the Financial 
and Asset Forfeiture Investigative Unit 
 
The operationalisation of the FAFI mandate, as outlined in the Guidance Document: Financial 
and Asset Forfeiture Investigations (South African Police Service, [sa]:8), the Standard 
Operating Procedure for Investigation Capacities: Information Note 3/1/5 (South African 
Police Service, 2010) as well as the Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations Strategy 
2015-2020 (South African Police Service, 2015), should be communicated to investigators 
through effective communication and marketing strategies.   
 
Workshops, information sessions and awareness campaigns should be provided to criminal 
investigators at station level and other units, in order to empower them with sufficient 
knowledge about the mandate of the FAFI unit. 
 
3.4.4 Recommendations regarding participants’ knowledge regarding the objectives of 
a financial investigation 
  
FAFI investigators should be sensitised to the primary objective of the unit as stipulated in the 
Financial and Asset Forfeiture Investigations Strategy 2015-2020 (South African Police 
Service, 2015).  In addition, investigators should be informed that the objective of financial 
investigation is not limited to the analysing of bank statements. However, investigators should 
be made aware that the ultimate goal of the financial investigation is to assist in the criminal 
investigation to help prove the crime. Investigators should understand the entire picture of 
financial investigation, for example, that the confiscating of the properties believed to be the 
proceeds of crime such as money laundering, after a cash flow analysis has been done, forms 








3.4.5 Recommendations on participants’ challenges experienced in the investigation of 
money laundering 
 
Internal and external relationships should be created and strengthened with relevant 
stakeholders, such as the SABRIC, the FIC, Banking Institutions and the NPA, through 
continuous consultation. The involvement of stakeholders from various spheres that would 
support the DPCI in combatting money laundering is imperative. A multi-disciplinary approach 
that will enable and assist the DPCI to achieve its objectives should be followed. The 
establishing and maintaining of such partnerships would promote cooperation and sharing of 
information to address money laundering; improve service delivery at all levels; jointly 
evaluate and assess threats, trends and modus operandi that could be utilised operationally; 
formulate strategies to achieve objective and set targets. When such relationships are created 
and strengthened, it would carry out the intent of section 41 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, which states that all organs of state in all areas of government must work 
together in the interest of all and in good faith. 
 
3.4.6 Recommendations on the role and responsibilities of financial and asset 
forfeiture investigators during the investigation of money laundering 
 
It is imperative that FAFI investigators realise that their role and responsibilities are not limited 
to the analysis of bank statements or profiling; however, investigators’ responsibilities also 
include lifestyle audits and investigate suspicious transaction reports. In addition, the 
investigating officer should obtain evidence to prove that the money that was obtained through 
the committing of the crime was laundered through financial and/or administrative systems to 
hide the origin/source of the money. In terms of lifestyle and suspicious transaction 
investigations, it is the responsibility of the financial investigating officer to point out where 
the money came from and do an investigation to find out if it had been obtained through legal 






3.4.7 Recommendations on contributing factors resulting in the low conviction rate of 
money laundering 
 
 A good working relationship between FAFI and the NPA should be nurtured to facilitate 
successful prosecutions of money laundering. 
 In order to facilitate improved conviction rates the FAFI should: 
- implement and maintain a database on operational issues 
- determine and analyse the performances of the branch offices 
- collect information to be utilised for the formulation and implementation of strategies 
to improve conviction rates 
 
These processes should be monitored continuously through the application of specific 
measuring processes to ensure successful convictions and to plan future operations. 
  
 Collaboration and communication should be created between the NPA and FAFI 
investigators to enhance the investigation and prosecution of money laundering. 
 There should be an alignment of the AFU, the NPA and FAFI priorities through 
consultation. 
 Continuous legal support should be available from the NPA, the AFU and the courts for 
FAFI investigators. 
 
3.4.8 Recommendations on the adequacy of resources to effectively investigate money 
laundering 
 
 All resources, including human and physical resources, at the FAFI unit should be 
effectively managed and administered.  
 A dedicated investigative capacity should be appointed within FAFI to conduct 
profiling to enhance the investigation. 






 The plans of the unit (short term, medium term and long term) should include resources 
such as human and physical resources. 
 Filling of vacant posts and procurement of physical resources should be prioritised to 
enhance the investigative capacity at the FAFI unit.  
 
3.4.9 Recommendations on the investigative technique/s used during the investigation 
of money laundering 
 
 Investigative techniques such as undercover investigations, the interception of 
communications and hacking of computer systems should be used by the FAFI 
investigators during investigations. These investigative techniques should include 
techniques, such as: 
- making a direct comparison where records with a historical connection of the 
suspect are examined 
- comparing income against expenditure 
- questioning unidentified cash and conducting investigations relating to 
acquired proceeds of unlawful activities to determine unexplained wealth 
- verifying the net worth of an individual – the assets and liabilities  
- conducting a financial analysis 
- conducting an investigation relating to the acquired proceeds of unlawful 
activities on STRs 
- acquiring any documentary evidence to confirm that a financial crime has 
been perpetrated (such as bank statements) and submitting their findings to 
the prosecutor to enable prosecution on charges of money laundering. 
 
 For a successful investigation of money laundering, investigators should be exposed 
to training and workshops on different investigative techniques that can be applied 







This study aimed to determine the quality of money laundering investigations done by the FAFI 
unit. The researcher obtained new information by seeking and finding literature pertaining to 
the research problem. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with the participants to also 
obtain data in this way. The researcher used a suitable research design and methodology to 
enable her to address the research aim, research purpose and research question of the study.  
 
The study attempted to answer the research question through the empirical research design and 
methodology that were used. The investigation needs specialised investigators who clearly 
understand the crime itself. Investigators should make use of different investigative techniques 
that are in place to investigate money laundering effectively. The study also established that 
the magistrate and prosecutors are part of the challenges in the investigation, by being reluctant 
to prosecute money laundering. Prosecutors are not concerned about the money laundering 
charges as they only focus on the predicate offence. The financial investigators are the ones 
who should follow the paper trail by making use of the relevant documents obtained and in this 
way bring enough evidence to ensure that money laundering charges could be added to the 
charge sheet. They also have to convince the prosecutors to add these charges. 
 
Magistrates, prosecutors and financial investigators play a crucial role in ensuring that the 
perpetrators are prosecuted. The researcher is of the opinion that this research will empower 
the financial and asset forfeiture investigators with enhanced knowledge in the investigation of 
money laundering. Members of the SAPS can access this study through the internet in order to 
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APPENDIX D   INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
1. Are you familiar with the legislative framework governing money laundering and the 
proceeds of illegal activities? 
 
2. Have you undergone training to investigate money laundering? If affirmative, was the 
training intervention/s efficient or not? 
 
3. In your own words, explain what the mandate of the Financial and Asset Forfeiture 
Investigative Unit is? 
 
4. In your opinion, what are the objectives of a financial investigation? 
 
5. Do you experience challenges/shortcomings to effectively investigate money 
laundering? 
 
6. According to you, what is your role and responsibilities as a financial and asset 
forfeiture investigator during the investigation of money laundering? 
 
7. According to you, what are the reason/s for the low conviction rate of money 
laundering? 
 
8. In your opinion, are you empowered with sufficient resources to effectively 
investigate money laundering? 
 
9. What investigative technique/s or strategy do you use during the investigation of 
money laundering? 
 
